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Financial Networks and Contagion
By Matthew Elliott, Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson ∗
We study cascades of failures in a network of interdependent fi-
nancial organizations: how discontinuous changes in asset values
(e.g., defaults and shutdowns) trigger further failures, and how
this depends on network structure. Integration (greater dependence
on counterparties) and diversification (more counterparties per or-
ganization) have different, nonmonotonic effects on the extent of
cascades. Diversification initially connects the network, permit-
ting cascades to travel; but as it increases further, organizations
are better insured against one anothers failures. Integration also
faces tradeoffs: increased dependence on other organizations ver-
sus less sensitivity to own investments. Finally, we illustrate the
model with data on European debt cross-holdings.
JEL: G32, D85, G01, F36, G33, G38, F15
Keywords: financial networks, networks, contagion, cascades, fi-
nancial crises, bankruptcy, diversification, integration, globaliza-
tion
Globalization brings with it increased financial interdependencies among many
kinds of organizations – governments, central banks, investment banks, firms, etc.
– that hold each other’s shares, debts and other obligations. Such interdependen-
cies can lead to cascading defaults and failures, which are often avoided through
massive bailouts of institutions deemed “too big to fail.” Recent examples in-
clude the U.S. government’s interventions in A.I.G., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and General Motors; and the European Commission’s interventions in Greece
and Spain. Although such bailouts circumvent the widespread failures that were
more prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they emphasize
the need to study the risks created by a network of interdependencies. Under-
standing these risks is crucial to designing incentives and regulatory responses
that defuse cascades before they are imminent.
In this paper we develop a general model that produces new insights regarding
financial contagions and cascades of failures among organizations linked through
a network of financial interdependencies. Organizations’ values depend on each
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other – e.g., through cross-holdings of shares, debt or other liabilities. If an
organization’s value becomes sufficiently low, it hits a failure threshold at which
it discontinuously loses further value; this imposes losses on its counterparties, and
these losses then propagate to others, even those who did not interact directly
with the organization initially failing. At each stage, other organizations may hit
failure thresholds and also discontinuously lose value. Relatively small and even
organization-specific shocks can be greatly amplified in this way.1
In our model, organizations hold primitive assets (any factors of production or
other investments) as well as shares in each other.2 The basic network we start
with describes which organizations directly hold which others. Cross-holdings lead
to a well-known problem of inflating book values3, and so we begin our analysis by
deriving a formula for a non-inflated “market value” that any organization delivers
to final investors outside the system of cross-holdings. This formula shows how
each organization’s market value depends on the values of the primitive assets
and on any failure costs that have hit the economy. We can therefore track how
asset values and failure costs propagate through the network of interdependencies.
An implication of failures being complementary is that cascades occur in “waves”
of dependencies. Although in practice these might occur all at once, it can be
useful to distinguish the sequence of dependencies in order to figure out how they
might be avoided. Some initial failures are enough to cause a second wave of
organizations to fail. Once these organizations fail, a third wave of failures may
occur, and so on. A variation on a standard algorithm4 then allows us compute
the extent of these cascades by using the formula discussed above to propagate
the failure costs at each stage and determine which organizations fail in the next
wave. Policymakers can use this algorithm in conjunction with the market value
formula to run counterfactual scenarios and identify which organizations might
be involved in a cascade under various initial scenarios.
With this methodology in hand, our main results show how the probability of
cascades and their extent depend on two key aspects of cross-holdings: integration
and diversification. Integration refers to the level of exposure of organizations to
each other: how much of an organization is privately held by final investors, and
how much is cross-held by other organizations. Diversification refers to how spread
out cross-holdings are: is a typical organization held by many others, or by just
a few? Integration and diversification have different, nonmonotonic effects on the
extent of cascades.
1The discontinuities incurred when an organization fails can include the cost of liquidating assets,
the (temporary) misallocation of productive resources, as well as direct legal and administrative costs.
Given that efficient investment or production can involve a variety of synergies and complementarities,
any interruption in the ability to invest or pay for and acquire some factors of production can lead to
discontinuously inefficient uses of other factors, or of investments. See Section 1.3 for more details.
2We model cross-holdings as direct (linear) claims on values of organizations for simplicity, but the
model extends to all sorts of debt and other contracts as discussed in Section 2 in the Online Appendix.
3See Brioschi, Buzzacchi, and Colombo (1989) and Fedenia, Hodder, and Triantis (1994).
4This sort of algorithm is the obvious one for finding extreme points of a lattice, and so is standard
in a variety of equilibrium settings. Ours is a variation on one from Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE FINANCIAL NETWORKS 3
If there is no integration then clearly there cannot be any contagion. As in-
tegration increases, the exposure of organizations to each other increases and so
contagions become possible. Thus, on a basic level increasing integration leads to
increased exposure which tends to increase the probability and extent of conta-
gions. The countervailing effect here is that an organization’s dependence on its
own primitive assets decreases as it becomes integrated. Thus, although integra-
tion can increase the likelihood of a cascade once an initial failure occurs, it can
also decrease the likelihood of that first failure.
With regard to diversification, there are also tradeoffs, but on different dimen-
sions. Here the overall exposure of organizations is held fixed but the number of
organizations cross-held is varied. With low levels of diversification, organizations
can be very sensitive to particular others, but the network of interdependencies
is disconnected and overall cascades are limited in extent. As diversification
increases, a “sweet spot” is hit where organizations have enough of their cross-
holdings concentrated in particular other organizations so that a cascade can oc-
cur, and yet the network of cross-holdings is connected enough for the contagion
to be far-reaching. Finally, as diversification is further increased, organizations’
portfolios are sufficiently diversified so that they become insensitive to any par-
ticular organization’s failure.
Putting these results together, an economy is most susceptible to widespread
financial cascades when two conditions hold. The first is that integration is inter-
mediate: each organization holds enough of its own assets that the idiosyncratic
devaluation of those assets can spark a first failure, and holds enough of other or-
ganizations for failures to propagate. The second condition is that organizations
are partly diversified: the network is connected enough for cascades to spread
widely, but nodes don’t have so many connections that they are well-insured
against the failure of any counterparty. Our analysis of these tradeoffs includes
both analytical results on a class of networks for which the dynamics of cas-
cades are tractable, as well as simulation results on other random cross-holding
networks.
In the simulations, we examine several important specific network structures.
One is a network with a clique of large “core” organizations surrounded by many
smaller “peripheral” organizations, each of which is linked to a core organization.
This emulates the network of interbank loans. There we see a further nonmono-
tonicity in integration: if core organizations have low levels of integration then the
failure of some peripheral organization is contained, with only one core organiza-
tion failing; if core organizations have middle levels of integration then widespread
contagions occur; if core organizations are highly integrated then they become less
exposed to any particular peripheral organization and more resistant to periph-
eral failures. A second model is one with concentrations of cross-holdings within
sectors or other groups. As cross-holdings become more sector-specific, particular
sectors become more susceptible to cascades, but widespread cascades become
less likely. The level of segregation at which this change happens depends on
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diversification. With lower diversification, cascades disappear at lower rates of
segregation – it takes less segregation to fragment the network and prevent cas-
cades.
We also consider what a regulator or government might do to mitigate the
possibility of cascades of failures. Preventing a first failure prevents the potential
ensuing cascade of failures and it might be hoped that a clever reallocation of
cross-holdings could achieve this. Unfortunately, we show that any fair exchange
of cross-holdings or assets involving the organization most at risk of failing makes
that organization more likely to fail at some asset prices close to the current
asset prices. Making the system unambiguously less susceptible to a first failure
necessitates “bailing out” the organization most at risk of failing.
Finally, we illustrate the model in the context of cross-holdings of European
debt.
While there is a growing literature on networks of interdependencies in financial
markets5 our methodology and results are different from any that we are aware
of, especially the results on nonmonotonicities in cascades due to integration and
diversification.
An independent study by Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), as
well as related earlier studies of Gourie´roux, He´am and Monfort (2012) and Gai
and Kapadia (2010), are the closest to ours.6 They each examine how shocks
propagate through a network based on debt holdings or interbank lending, where
shocks lead an organization to pay only a portion of its debts. They are also
interested in how shocks propagate as a function of network architecture. How-
ever, beyond the basic motivation and focus on the network propagation of shocks,
the studies are quite different and complementary. The main results of Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) characterize the best and worst networks from
a social planner’s perspective. For moderate shocks a perfectly diversified pattern
of holdings is optimal, while for very large shocks perfectly diversified holdings
become the worst possible.7 Our focus is on the complementary question of what
happens for intermediate shocks and for a variety of networks. To this end, we
5For example, see Rochet and Tirole (1996), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Allen and Gale (2000), Eisen-
berg and Noe (2001), Upper and Worms (2004), Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2005), Leitner (2005), Allen
and Babus (2009), Lorenza, Battiston, Schweitzer (2009), Gai and Kapadia (2010), Wagner (2010), Billio
et al. (2012), Demange (2012), Diebold and Yilmaz (2011), Dette, Pauls, and Rockmore (2011), Gai,
Haldane, and Kapadia (2011), Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2012), Ibragimov, Jaffee and Walden
(2011), Upper (2011), Acemoglu et al. (2012), Allen, Babus and Carletti (2012), Cohen-Cole, Patacchini
and Zenou (2012), Gourie´roux, He´am and Monfort (2012), Alvarez and Barlevy (2013), Glasserman and
Young (2013) and Gofman (2013).
6Cabrales, Gottardi, and Vega-Redondo (2013) study the tradeoff between the risk-sharing enabled
by greater interconnection and the greater exposure to cascades resulting from larger components in the
financial network. Their focus is also on some benchmark networks (minimally connected and complete
ones) and they examine which ones are best for different distributions of shocks. Again, our work is
complementary not only in terms of distinguishing diversification and integration but also analyzing
comparative statics for intermediate network structures and finding nonmonotonicites there.
7Shaffer (1994) also identifies a trade-off between risk sharing and systemic failures. While diversified
portfolios reduce risk, they also result in organizations holding similar portfolios and a system susceptible
to simultaneous failures. See also Ibragimov, Jaffee and Walden (2011) and Allen, Babus and Carletti
(2012).
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consider a class of random networks and ask how the consequences of a given mod-
erate shock depend on diversification and integration. The results highlight that
intermediate levels of diversification and integration can be the most problematic.
Gai and Kapadia (2010) made two observations. First: rare, large shocks may
have extreme consequences when they occur – a point elaborated upon in the
subsequent literature discussed above. Second, a shock of a given magnitude
may have very different consequences depending on where in the network it hits
and on the average connectivity of the network. Gai and Kapadia develop these
points in a standard model of epidemics in which the network is characterized by
its degree distribution. An innovation of our model is to go beyond the degree
distribution of a network and calculate equilibrium (fixed-point) values and inter-
dependencies for organizations. Doing so allows us to distinguish an important
dimension of financial networks: integration, which can be varied independently
of diversification. Building on that, we show how diversification and integration
each affect the ingredients of financial cascades – and the final outcomes – in
different and non-monotonic ways. In doing so, we recover, as a special case,
Gai and Kapadia’s observation that cascades can be non-monotonic in connec-
tivity.8 But we also gain key new results on when and how the “danger zone” of
intermediate diversification can be blunted by changing the level of integration
in the system. Finally, we study how the integration of a financial network inter-
acts with a core-periphery structure and with segregation, and other correlation
structures.
I. The Model and Determining Organizations’ Values with Cross-Holdings
A. Primitive Assets, Organizations, and Cross-Holdings
There are n organizations (e.g., countries, banks, or firms) making up a set
N = {1, . . . , n}.
The values of organizations are ultimately based on the values of primitive
assets or factors of production – from now on simply assets – M = {1, . . .m}.
For concreteness, a primitive asset may be thought of as a project that generates
a net flow of cash over time.9 The present value (or market price) of asset k is
denoted pk. Let Dik ≥ 0 be the share of the value of asset k held by (i.e., flowing
directly into) organization i and let D denote the matrix whose (i, k)-th entry is
equal to Dik. (Analogous notation is used for all matrices.)
An organization can also hold shares of other organizations. For any i, j ∈ N
the number Cij ≥ 0 is the fraction of organization j owned by organization i,
where Cii = 0 for each i.
10 The matrix C can be thought of as a network in
8In different settings, Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2005) and Gofman (2013) also find that cascades
can be non-monotonic in connectivity.
9The primitive assets could be more general factors: prices of inputs, values of outputs, the quality of
organizational know-how, investments in human capital, etc. To keep the exposition simple, we model
these as abstract investments and assume that net positions are nonnegative in all assets.
10It is possible to instead allow Cii > 0, which leads to some straightforward adjustments in the
6 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
which there is a directed link from j to i if value flows in that direction – i.e., if
i owns a positive share of j, so that Cij > 0.
11
After all these cross-holding shares are accounted for, there remains a share
Ĉii := 1−
∑
j∈N Cji of organization i not owned by any organization in the system
– a share assumed to be positive.12 This is the part that is owned by outside
shareholders of i, external to the system of cross-holdings. The off-diagonal entries
of the matrix Ĉ are defined to be 0.
Cross-holdings are modeled as linear dependencies in this paper, and we now
briefly discuss the interpretation of this. We view the functional form as an ap-
proximation of debt contracts around and below organizations’ failure thresholds
– the region of organizations’ values that are important whenever one’s failure
causes another to fail. In this region, under most bankruptcy procedures13 there
is linear rationing in how much of the debt is paid back. Some organizations
may be far from their failure thresholds, and for those, others’ changes in value
have a smaller effect on the risk of failure. The linear model can incorporate
both of these effects through the slope parameters in the cross-holdings matrix;
this is discussed in detail in Section 1.5, as well as Section 2 of the Online Ap-
pendix. Of course, this is a crude approximation, but allows a tractable analysis
of cross-dependencies, and provides basic insights that should still be useful when
nonlinearities are addressed in detail. More generally, cross-holdings can involve
all sorts of contracts; any liability in the form of some payment that is due could
be included.14 Directly modeling other sorts of contracting between organizations
would complicate the analysis and so we focus on this formulation for now to il-
lustrate the basic issues. Section 2 in the Online Appendix discusses extending
the model to more general liabilities.
B. Values of Organizations: Accounting and Adjusting for Cross-Holdings
In a setting with cross-holdings, there are subtleties in determining the “fair
market” value of an organization, and the real economic costs of organizations’
derivations that follow; but one needs to be careful in interpreting what it means for an organization to
have cross-holdings in itself – which effectively translates into a form of private ownership.
11 Some definitions: a path from i1 to i` in a matrix M is a sequence of distinct nodes i1, i1, . . . , i`
such that Mir+1ir > 0 for each r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ` − 1}. A cycle is a sequence of (not necessarily distinct)
nodes i1, i1, . . . , i` such that Mir+1ir > 0 for each r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `− 1} and Mi1ir > 0.
12This assumption ensures that organization’s market values (discussed below) are well-defined. It is
slightly stronger than necessary. It would suffice to assume that, for every organization i, there is some
j such that Ĉjj > 0 and there is a path from j to i. An organization with Ĉii = 0 would essentially
be a holding company, and the important aspect is to have an economy where there are at least some
organizations that are not holding companies and some outside shareholders that no organizations have
claims on.
13A richer model would include priority classes, but the basic issues that we address in the simplified
model should still appear in such a richer model.
14In essence, our modeling is a reduced form that aggregates all effects into a linear dependence of each
organization on others, allowing for a discontinuous loss at a critical organization value. In cases where
organizations can short sell other organizations, or hold options or other derivatives that appreciate in
value when another organization falls in value, some of our lattice results (discussed in Sections 1.6 and
2.2.3) would no longer hold. That is an interesting topic for further research.
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failures. Doing the accounting correctly is essential to analyzing cascades of fail-
ure. The basic framework for the accounting was developed by Brioschi, Buz-
zacchi, and Colombo (1989) and Fedenia, Hodder, and Triantis (1994). In this
section, we briefly review the accounting and the key valuation equations in the
absence of failure costs. In ensuing sections, we incorporate failures and associ-
ated discontinuities.
The equity value Vi of an organization i is the total value of its shares – those
held by other organizations as well as those held by outside shareholders. This is
equal to the value of organization i’s primitive assets plus the value of its claims
on other organizations:
(1) Vi =
∑
k
Dikpk +
∑
j
CijVj .
Equation (1) can be written in matrix notation as
V = Dp + CV
and solved to yield15
(2) V = (I−C)−1Dp.
Adding up equation (1) across organizations (and recalling that each column of
D adds up to 1) shows that the sum of the Vi exceeds the total value of primitive
assets held by the organizations. Essentially, each dollar of net primitive assets
directly held by organization i contributes a dollar to the equity value of organi-
zation i, but then is also counted partially on the books of all the organizations
that have an equity stake in i.16
As argued by both Brioschi, Buzzacchi, and Colombo (1989) and Fedenia, Hod-
der, and Triantis (1994), the ultimate (non-inflated) value of an organization to
the economy – what we call the “market” value – is well-captured by the equity
value of that organization that is held by its outside investors. This value cap-
tures the flow of real assets that accrues to final investors of that organization.
15Under the assumption that each column of C sums to less than 1 (which holds by our assumption
of nonzero outside holdings in each organization), the inverse (I−C)−1 is well-defined and nonnegative
(Meyer, 2000, Section 7.10).
16This initially counterintuitive feature is discussed in detail by French and Poterba (1991) and Fedenia,
Hodder, and Triantis (1994).
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The market value, which we denote by vi, is equal to ĈiiVi, and therefore:
17
(3) v = ĈV = Ĉ(I−C)−1Dp = ADp.
We refer to A = Ĉ(I − C)−1 as the dependency matrix. It is reminiscent of
Leontief’s input-output analysis. Equation 3 shows that value of an organization
can be represented as a sum of the value of its ultimate claims on primitive
assets, with organization i owning a share Aij of j’s direct holdings of primitive
assets. This is the portfolio of underlying assets an outside investor would hold
to replicate the returns generated by holding organization i. To see this, suppose
each organization fully owns exactly one proprietary asset, so that m = n and
D = I. In this case, Aij describes the dependence of i’s value on j’s proprietary
asset. It is reassuring that A is column stochastic so that indeed the total values
of all organizations add up to the total values of all underlying assets – for all
j ∈ N , we have18 ∑
i∈N
Aij = 1.
C. Discontinuities in Values and Failure Costs
An important part of our model is that organizations can lose productive value
in discontinuous ways if their values fall below certain critical thresholds. These
discontinuities can lead to cascading failures and also the presence of multiple
equilibria.
There are many sources of such discontinuities. For example, if an airline can
no longer pay for fuel, then its planes may be forced to sit idle (as happened with
Spanair in February of 2012) which leads to a discontinuous drop in revenue in
response to lost new bookings, and so forth. If a country or firm’s debt rating
is downgraded, it often experiences a discontinuous jump in its cost of capital.
Dropping below a critical value might also involve bankruptcy proceedings and
17A way to double check this equation is to derive the market value of an organization from the
book value of its underlying assets and cross-holdings less the part of its book value promised to other
organizations in cross-holdings:
vi =
∑
j
CijVj −
∑
j
CjiVi +
∑
k
Dikpk
or
v = CV − (I− Ĉ)V +Dp = (C− (I− Ĉ))V +Dp.
Substituting for the book value V from (2), this becomes
v = (C− I+ Ĉ)(I−C)−1Dp+Dp = (C− I+ Ĉ+ (I−C))(I−C)−1Dp = ADp.
18This can be seen by defining an augmented system in which there is a node corresponding to each
organization’s external investor and noting that, under our assumptions, the added nodes are the only
absorbing states of the Markov chain corresponding to the system of asset flows. Column j of A describes
how the proprietary assets entering at node j are shared out among the external absorbing nodes. Since
all the flow must end up at some external absorbing node, A must be column-stochastic.
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legal costs. Broadly, many of these discontinuities stem from an illiquidity which
then leads to an inefficient use of assets. Indeed, given that efficient production
can involve a variety of synergies and complementarities, any interruption in the
ability to pay for and acquire some factors of production can lead to discontinu-
ously inefficient uses of other factors, or of investments. One detailed and simple
microfoundation is laid out in Section 1.5 below.
If the value vi of a organization i falls below some threshold level vi, then i is
said to fail and incurs failure costs βi(p).
19 These failure costs are subtracted
from a failing organization’s cash flow. They can represent the diversion of cash
flow towards dealing with the failure or a reduction in the returns generated by
proprietary assets. Either way this introduces critical non-linearities – indeed,
discontinuities – into the system.
We base failure costs on the (market) value of an organization, vi, and not the
book value, Vi. This captures the idea that failure occurs when an organization
has difficulties or disruptions in operating, and the artificial inflation in book val-
ues that accompanies cross-holdings is irrelevant in avoiding a failure threshold.20
Nonetheless, the model could instead make failures dependent upon the book val-
ues Vi, in cases where cash flows relate to book values. Nothing qualitative would
change in what follows, as the critical ingredients of thresholds of discontinuities
and cascades that depend on cross-holdings would still all be present, just with
different trigger points.
Let us say a few words about the relative sizes of these discontinuities. Re-
cent work has estimated the cost of default to average 21.7 percent of the market
value of an organization’s assets, (with substantial variation – see Davydenko,
Strebulaev, and Zhao (2012), as well as James (1991)).21 It might be hoped that
organizations will reduce the scope for cascades of failures by minimizing their
failure costs and reducing the threshold values at which they fail. In fact, as we
show in the Online Appendix (Section 3), financial networks can create moral
hazard and favor the opposite outcome. As discussed in Leitner Leitner (2005),
counterparties have incentives to bail out a failing organization22 to avoid (indi-
rectly) incurring failure costs. To improve its bargaining position in negotiating
for such aid, an organization may then want to increase its failure costs and make
its failure more likely. Nevertheless, although default costs can be large both
absolutely and relative to the value of an organization’s assets (e.g., the size of
the recent Greek write-down in debt, or the fire-sale of Lehman Brothers’ assets),
it can also be that smaller effects snowball. Given that a major recession in an
economy is only a matter of a change of a few percentage points in its growth
19The argument p reflects that these costs can depend on the values of underlying assets, as would be
the case when these are liquidated for a fraction of their former value. See Section 1.5 for more detail.
20For example, if the failure threshold were based on book values, then two organizations about to fail
would be able to avoid failure by exchanging cross-holdings and inflating their book values.
21Capping the failure costs is not important for our model, but they could easily be capped at vi or
(Dp)i or some other natural level.
22For example, in the form a debt write-down.
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rate, when contagions are far-reaching, the particular drops in value of any single
organization need not be very large in order to have a large effect on the economy.
We develop this observation further in Section 2.1.
D. Including Failure Costs in Market Values
The valuations in (2) and (3) have analogs when we include discontinuities
in value due to failures. The discontinuous drop imposes cost directly on an
organization’s balance sheet, and so the book value of organization i becomes:
Vi =
∑
j 6=i
CijVj +
∑
k
Dikpk − βiIvi<vi
where Ivi<vi is an indicator variable taking value 1 if vi < vi and value 0 otherwise.
This leads to a new version of (2):
(4) V = (I−C)−1(Dp− b(v,p)),
where bi(v,p) = βi(p)Ivi<vi .
23 Correspondingly, (3) is re-expressed as
(5) v = Ĉ(I−C)−1(Dp− b(v)) = A(Dp− b(v,p)).
An entry Aij of the dependency matrix describes the proportion of j’s failure
costs that i bears when j fails as well as i’s claims on the primitive assets that j
directly holds. If organization j fails, thereby incurring failure costs of βj , then
i’s value will decrease by Aijβj .
E. A Simple Microfoundation
To help fix ideas, we discuss one simple microfoundation – among many – of
the model and the value equations provided above.
Organizations are owner-operated firms. For simplicity, let each firm have a
single proprietary asset: an investment project that generates a return. Our
model is then simplified to the case m = n and D = I. Firms have obligations
to each other: for instance, promised payments for inputs or other intermediate
goods. These obligations comprise the cross-holdings. Once a firm’s value no
longer covers the full promised value of its payments, all creditor organizations –
who are of equal seniority – are rationed in proportion to Vi, with organization
j claiming CijVi of i’s value. Thus, even though the obligations might initially
be in the form of debt, the relevant scenario for our cascades – and the one the
model focuses on – is one in which the full promised amounts cannot be met by
23The number bi(v,p) reflects realized failure costs, and is zero when failure does not occur. It always
depends on the asset values through the indicator Ivi≤v , but the bankruptcy costs βi may depend on
underlying asset values, p. See Section 1.5 below for an example. We will suppress the argument p when
it is not essential.
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the organizations. This is a regime of “orderly write-downs” in which creditors
are willing to take a fraction of the face value they are owed. Thus, the values
of cross-holdings are simply linear in Vi, as in our equations. (Section 2 in the
Online Appendix illustrates this in detail.)
The value left to the owner-operators is vi = ĈiiVi. While the firm continues to
operate, this amount must cover return on capital, wages, benefits, and pension
obligations for the owner operators.24 The share Ĉii can be thought of as all of
the stock or equity held in the firm, while the Cij ’s are payment obligations from
the firm to other firms. The Ĉii residual shares correspond to the control rights
of the firm, while the Cij ’s simply represent obligations to other creditors. If
the value left to the owner-operators/shareholders is sufficiently low (below some
outside option value of their time or effort), they may choose to cease operations.25
Indeed, we posit that there is a critical threshold vi such that if the value available
to the owner-operator falls below it, he or she chooses to cease operations and to
liquidate the asset. In other words, once vi < vi the asset is liquidated.
Liquidation is irreversible and total: a firm cannot partially liquidate its pro-
prietary asset. Liquidation is also costly: if i liquidates its proprietary asset, it
incurs a loss of λi cents on the dollar.
26 In terms of our model, βi(p) = λipi.
Recalling that bi(v,p) = βi(p)Ivi<vi , it follows that
v = A (p− b(v,p)) .
F. Equilibrium Existence and Multiplicity
A solution for organization values in equation (5) is an equilibrium set of values,
and encapsulates the network of cross-holdings in a clean and powerful form,
building on the dependency matrix A.
There always exists a solution and there can exist multiple solutions to the
valuation equation (multiple vectors v satisfying (5)) in the presence of the dis-
continuities. In fact, the set of solutions forms a complete lattice.27
There are two distinct sources of equilibrium multiplicity. First, taking other
organizations’ values and the values of underlying assets as fixed and given, there
can be multiple possible consistent values of organization i that solve equation
(5). There may be a value of vi satisfying equation (5) such that 1vi<vi = 0
and another value of vi satisfying equation (5) such that 1vi<vi = 1; even when
all other prices and values are held fixed. This source of multiple equilibria
24Indirectly, the value vi includes the cross-holdings that firm i has in others; that is, accounts receiv-
able that can be used to meet payroll and other obligations.
25This can happen for various reasons. For example, in the case of Spanair, there was too little money
to cover wages, fuel, and other basic maintenance costs, and the airline was forced to cease operations. It
could also be that the owners no longer view it worthwhile to continue to devote efforts to this investment
project.
26These losses involve time that the asset is left idle, costs of assessing values and holding sales of
assets, costs of moving assets to another production venue, and loss of firm specific capital and knowledge.
27This holds by a standard application of Tarski’s fixed point theorem, as failures are complements.
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corresponds to the standard story of self-fulfilling bank runs (see classic models
such as Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). The second source of multiple equilibria is
the interdependence of the values of the organizations: the value of i depends on
the value of organization j, while the value of organization j depends on the value
of organization i. There might then be two consistent valuation vectors for i and
j: one in which both i and j fail and another in which both i and j remain solvent.
This second source of multiple equilibria is different from the individual bank run
concept, as here organizations fail because people expect other organizations to
fail, which then becomes self-fulfilling.
In what follows, we typically focus on the best case equilibrium, in which as
few organizations as possible fail.28 This allows us to isolate sources of nec-
essary cascades, distinct from self-fulfilling sorts of failure, which have already
been studied in the sunspot and bank run literatures. When we do discuss mul-
tiple equilibria, we will consider only the second novel source of multiplicity –
multiplicity due to interdependencies between organizations – rather than the
well-known phenomenon of a bank run on a single organization. With suitable
regularity conditions (so that other equilibria are appropriately stable in some
range of parameters), the results presented below should have analogs applying
to other equilibria, including the worst case equilibrium.
G. Measuring Dependencies
The dependency matrix A takes into account all indirect holdings as well as
direct holdings. The central insights of the paper are derived using this matrix.
In this section we identify some useful properties of the dependency matrix A
and explore its relation to direct cross-holdings C.
An Example
To see how the dependency matrix A and direct cross-holdings matrix C might
differ, consider the following example. Suppose there are two organizations, i =
1, 2, each of which has a 50 percent stake in the other organization. The associated
cross-holdings matrix C and the dependency matrix A are as follows. (Recall that
Ĉii is equal to 1 minus the sum of the entries in column i of C.)
C =
(
0 0.5
0.5 0
)
Ĉ =
(
0.5 0
0 0.5
)
A = Ĉ(I−C)−1 =
(
2
3
1
3
1
3
2
3
)
.
In this simple example, we can already see that direct claims – as captured by
C and Ĉ – can differ quite substantially from the ultimate value dependencies
described by A. First, even though an organization 1’s shareholders have a direct
28As discussed in Section 2.2.3, in this best case equilibrium no organization fails that does not also
fail in all other equilibria.
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claim on 50 percent of its value, they are ultimately entitled to more than this
– as they also have some claims on the value of organization 2, which includes
part of the value of organization 1. Second, the ultimate dependence of each
organization on the other is smaller than what is apparent from C, by the fact
that value is conserved.29
Although A can differ substantially from the direct holdings captured by C+Ĉ,
some general statements can be made about the differences.
Lemma 1. Ĉii is a lower bound on Aii, but Aii can be much larger than Ĉii.
1) Aii
Ĉii
≥ 1 for each i, with equality if and only if there are no cycles of cross-
holdings (i.e. directed cycles in C) that include i.
2) For any n, there exists a sequence of n-by-n matrices
(
C(`)
)
such that
A
(`)
ii
Ĉ
(`)
ii
→∞ for all i.
The magnitudes of the terms on the main diagonal of A turn out to be critical
for determining whether and to what extent failures cascades (Section 2.1) and
the size of a moral hazard problem we discuss in the Online Appendix. Lemma
1 demonstrates that the lead diagonal of A can be larger than the lead diagonal
of Ĉ, but can never be smaller. The potential for a large divergence comes from
the fact that sequences of cross-holdings can involve cycles (i holds j, who holds
k, who holds `, . . . , who holds i), so that i can end up with a higher dependency
on its own assets than indicated by looking only at its outside investors’ direct
holdings (Ĉii) .
H. Avoiding a First Failure
Before moving on to our main results regarding diversification and integration,
we provide a result that uses our model to show that there are necessarily tradeoffs
in preventing the spark that ignites a cascade. Any fair trades of cross-holdings
and assets that help an organization avoid failure in some circumstances must
make it vulnerable to failure in some new circumstances. This is a sort of “no-
free-lunch” result for avoiding first failures.
To state this result, it is helpful to introduce some notation. We write or-
ganization i’s value assuming no failures at asset prices p, cross-holdings C and
direct holdings D as vi(p,C,D). An organization i is closest to failing at positive
asset prices p, cross-holdings C, and direct holdings D if there exists a (neces-
sarily unique) λ > 0 such that at asset prices λp, organization i is about to fail,
vi(λp,C,D) = vi, while all other organizations are solvent, vj(λp,C,D) > vj for
j 6= i. Define q(p,C,D) := λp.
29A further (starker) illustration of A and C can differ is available in the Online Appendix (Section
1).
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Before stating the result we also introduce the concept of fair trades.30 Fair
trades are exchanges of cross-holdings or underlying assets that leave the (market)
values of the organizations unchanged at current asset prices.31 More precisely,
the matrices (C,D) and (C′,D′) are said to be related by a fair trade at p if
v = v′, where v = Ap and v′ = A′p; the matrix A′ is computed as in (5) with
C′ and D′ playing the roles of C and D.32
Proposition 1. Suppose an organization i is closest to failing at asset prices p,
cross-holdings C, and direct holdings D. Consider new cross-holdings and direct
holdings C′ and D′ resulting from a fair trade at p so that row i of A′ is different
from that of A. Then, for any ε > 0, there is a p′ within an ε-neighborhood
of q(p,C,D),33 such that i fails at prices p′ after the fair trade but not before:
vi(p
′,C′,D′) < vi < vi(p′,C,D).
It is conceivable that if an organization is at risk of eventual failure but not
imminent failure there could exist some fair trades that would unambiguously
make that organization safer: prone to failure at a smaller set of prices. An orga-
nization might hedge a particular risk. Proposition 1 shows that, at least when
it comes to saving the most vulnerable organization, there are always tradeoffs:
new holdings that avoid failure at one set of prices make failure more likely at
another set of nearby prices. So, to fully avoid a failure (at nearby prices) once
it is imminent requires some unfair trades or external infusion of capital.
II. Cascades of Failures: Definitions and Preliminaries
In order to present our main results, we need to first provide some background
results and definitions regarding how the model captures cascades, which we
present in this section. These preliminaries outline how failures cascade and
become amplified, a simple algorithm for identifying the waves of failures in a
cascade, and our distinction between diversification and integration.
A. Amplification through Cascades of Failures
A relatively small shock to even a small organization can have large effects
by triggering a cascade of failures. The following example illustrates this. For
simplicity, suppose that organization 1 has complete ownership of a single asset
with value p1. Suppose that p
′ differs from p only in the price of asset 1, such that
p′1 < p1. Finally, suppose v1(p) > v1(p) > v1(p′) so that 1 fails after the shock
30This definition takes prices of assets (p) as given, but not necessarily the prices of organizations,
valuing them based on their holdings. It does not incorporate the potential impact of failures of organi-
zations on their values. Thus it is a benchmark that abstracts away from the failure costs, which is the
right benchmark for the exercise of seeing the impact of trades on first-failures.
31So, absent failure, the values of organizations are the same before and after fair trades.
32We show in Section 3.1 of the Online Appendix that there are circumstances under which organiza-
tions may have incentives to undertake “unfair” trades because of the failure costs.
33I.e. p′ such that ‖p′ − q(p,C,D)‖∞ < ε, where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the sup-norm.
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changing asset values from p to p′. Beyond the loss in value due to the decrease
in the value of asset 1, organizations 2’s value also decreases by a term arising
from 1’s failure cost, A21β1 (recall (5)). If organization 2 also fails, organization
3 absorbs part of both failure costs: A31β1 + A32β2, and so organization 3 may
fail too, and so forth. With each failure, the combined shock to the value of each
remaining solvent organization increases and organizations that were further and
further from failure before the initial shock can get drawn into the cascade. If, for
example, the first K organization end up failing in the cascade, the the cumulative
failure costs to the economy are β1 + · · ·+βK , which can greatly exceed the drop
in asset value that precipitated the cascade.
B. Who Fails in a Cascade?
A first step towards understanding how susceptible a system is to a cascade of
failures, and how extensive such a cascade might be, is to identify which organi-
zations will fail following a shock. Again, we focus on the best-case equilibrium.34
Studying the best case equilibrium following a shock identifies the minimal pos-
sible set of organizations that could fail. (Results for the worst-case equilibrium
are easy analogs identifying the maximal possible set of organizations that will
fail.)
Identifying Who Fails When
To understand how and when failures cascade we need to better understand
when a fall in asset prices will cause an initial failure and whether the first failure
will result in other failures. Utilizing the dependency matrix A, for each orga-
nization i we can identify the boundary in the space of underlying asset prices
below which organization i must fail, assuming no other organization has failed
yet. We can also identify how the failure of one organization affects the failure
boundaries of other organizations and so determine when cascades will occur and
who will fail in those cascades. We begin with an example that illustrates these
ideas very simply, and then develop the more general analysis.
Example Continued
Let us return to the example introduced in Section 1.7.1, taking D = I, so
each organization owns one proprietary asset. We suppose that organization i
fails when its value falls below 50 and upon failing incurs failure costs of 50.
Organization i therefore fails when 23pi +
1
3pj < 50. Figure 1a shows the failure
frontiers for the two organizations. When asset prices are above both failure
frontiers, neither organization fails in the best case equilibrium outcome. One
34This is the best case equilibrium across all possible equilibria; this statement remains true even when
we consider multiplicity not arising from interdependencies among organizations.
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(d) Cascades of Failure
Figure 1. : With positive cross-holdings the discontinuities in values generated by
the failure costs can result in multiple equilibria and cascades of failure.
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object that we study is the boundary between this region and the region in which
at least one organization fails in all equilibria. We call this boundary the first
failure frontier and it is shown in Figure 1b.
The failure boundaries shown in Figure 1a are not the end of the story. If
organization j fails, then organization i’s value falls discontinuously. In effect,
through i’s cross-holding in j and the reduction in j’s value, i bears 1/3 of j’s
failure costs of 50. Organization i then fails if 23pi +
1
3(pj − 50) < 50. We refer to
this new failure threshold as i’s failure frontier conditional on j failing and label
it FF ′i . These conditional failure frontiers are shown in Figure 1c.
The conditional failure frontiers identify a region of multiple equilibria due to
interdependencies in the value of the organizations. As discussed earlier, this is
a different source of multiple equilibria from the familiar bank run story (we do
not depict the multiple equilibria corresponding to this). The multiple equilibria
arise because i’s value decreases discontinuously when j fails and j’s value de-
creases discontinuously when i fails. It is then consistent for both i to and j to
survive, in which case the relevant failure frontiers are the unconditional ones,
and consistent for both i and j to fail, in which case the relevant failure frontiers
are the conditional ones.
Figure 1d identifies the regions where cascades occur in the best case equilib-
rium.35 When asset prices move from being outside the first failure frontier to
being inside this region, the failure of one organization precipitates the failure
of the other organization. One organization crosses its unconditional (best-case)
failure frontier and the corresponding asset prices are also inside the other orga-
nization’s conditional failure frontier (which includes the costs arising from the
other organizations failure).36
A Simple Algorithm for Identifying Cascade Hierarchies
Although all the relevant information about exactly who will fail at what asset
prices can be represented in diagrams such as those in the previous section for
simple examples, the number of conditional failure frontiers grows exponentially
with organizations and while adding assets increases the dimensions making their
geometric depiction infeasible. Thus, while the diagrams provide a useful device
for introducing ideas, they are of less use practically. In this section, we provide
an algorithm that traces the propagation of a specific shock that causes one
35Compare with Figure 3 in Gourie´roux, He´am and Monfort (2012), which makes some of the same
points.
36As hinted at above, the full set of multiple equilibria is more complex than pictured in Figure 1 and
this is discussed in the Online Appendix (Sections 7 and 8). For example the worst-case equilibrium has
frontiers further out than those in Figure 1c, as those are based on including failure costs arising from
the other organization failing. The worst-case equilibrium is obtained by examining frontiers based on
failure costs presuming that both fail, and then finding prices consistent with those frontiers. There are
also additional equilibria that differ from both the best and worst case equilibria – ones that presume
one organization’s failure but not the other organization’s, and find the highest prices consistent with
these presumptions.
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organization to fail.37 As before, we focus on the best-case equilibrium in terms
of having the fewest failures and the maximum possible values vi.
At step t of the algorithm, let the set Zt be the set of failed organizations.
Initialize Z0 = ∅. At step t ≥ 1:
1) Let b˜t−1 be a vector with element b˜i = βi if i ∈ Zt−1 and 0 otherwise.
2) Let Zt be the set of all k such that entry k of the following vector is negative:
A
[
Dp− b˜t−1
]
− v.
3) Terminate if Zt = Zt−1. Otherwise return to step 1.
When this algorithm terminates at step T (which it will given the finite number
of organizations), the set ZT corresponds to the set of organizations that fail in
the best case equilibrium.38
This algorithm provides us with hierarchies of failures. That is, the various
organizations that are added at each step (the new entries in Zt compared to
Zt−1) are organizations whose failures were triggered by the cumulative list of
prior failures; they would not have failed if not for that accumulation and, in
particular, if not for the failures of those added at the last step. Thus, Z1 are the
first organizations to fail, then Z2 \ Z1 are those whose failures are triggered by
the first to fail, and so forth.
Note that the sets depend on p (and C and D), and so each configuration of
these can result in a different structure of failures. It is possible to have some C
and D such that there are some organizations that are never the first to fail, and
others who are sometimes the first to fail and sometimes not.
The hierarchical structure of failures has immediate and strong policy implica-
tions. If any level of the hierarchy can be made empty, then the cascade stops
and no further organization will fail. This suggests that one cost effective policy
for limiting the effect of failures should be to target high levels of the hierarchy
that consist of relatively few organizations.39 However, such policies may involve
more intervention than is necessary. For example, within a wave there could be
a single critical organization, the saving of which would prevent any further fail-
ure regardless of whether other organizations in the same level failed. Saving an
entire level from failure is sufficient for stopping a cascade, but not necessary.
37This sort of algorithm is the obvious one for finding extreme points of a lattice, and so is standard
(for instance, see Theorem Theorem 5.1 in Vives (1990)). Variations on it appear in the literature on
contagions, as in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Blume et al (2011).
38The same algorithm can be used to find the set of organizations that fail in the worst case equilibrium
by instead initializing the set Z0 to contain all organizations and looking for organizations that will not
fail, and so forth.
39As considered in Section 1.8.
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C. Defining Integration and Diversification
One of our contributions is a distinction between the roles of diversification and
integration in cascades. Before presenting those results (in the next Section), we
provide the essential distinction.
We say that a financial system becomes more diversified when the number of
cross-holders in each organization i weakly increases and the cross-holdings of all
original cross-holders of i weakly decrease.
Formally, cross-holdings C′ are more diversified than cross-holdings C if and
only if
• C ′ij ≤ Cij for all i, j such that Cij > 0, with strict inequality for some
ordered pair (i, j), and
• C ′ij > Cij = 0 for some i, j.
Thus, diversification captures the spread in organizations’ cross-holdings.
A financial system becomes more integrated if the external shareholders of each
organization i have lower holdings, so that the total cross-holdings of the each
organization by other organizations weakly increases.
Formally, cross-holdings C′ are more integrated than cross-holdings C if and
only if Ĉ ′ii ≤ Ĉii for all i with strict inequality for some i. This is equivalent to
the condition that ∑
j:j 6=i
C ′ji ≥
∑
j:j 6=i
Cji,
for all i with strict inequality for some i.40
Thus, integration captures the depth or extent of organizations’ cross-holdings.
This can be viewed as an intensive margin. In contrast, diversification pertains
to the number of organizations interacting directly with one another, and so is
an extensive margin.
It is possible for a change in cross-holdings to both increase diversification and
integration. There are changes in cross-holdings that increase diversification but
not integration and other changes that increase integration but not diversification.
D. Essential Ingredients of a Cascade
To best understand the impact of diversification and integration on cascades it
is useful to identify three ingredients that are necessary for a widespread cascade:
I. A First Failure: Some organization must be susceptible enough to shocks
in some assets that it fails.
40This definition is simple and well-suited to our simulations as in these we will have symmetric values
of underlying assets. However, when underlying asset values are asymmetric there may be changes
in cross-holdings consistent with either increasing or decreasing integration that result in substantial
changes in the relative values of organizations, and so a more complicated definition is needed. Thus, in
our formal results we work with a definition that also holds organizations’ market values constant.
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II. Contagion: It must be that some other organizations are sufficiently sensi-
tive to the first organization’s failure that they also fail.41
III. Interconnection: It must be that the network of cross-holdings is sufficiently
connected so that the failures can continue to propagate and are not limited
to some small component.
Keeping these different ingredients of cascades in mind will help us disentangle
the different effects of changes in cross-holdings.
Let us preview of some of the ideas, which we will soon make precise in by
imposing some additional structure on the model. As we increase integration
(without changing each organization’s counterparties), an organization becomes
less sensitive to its own investments but more sensitive to other organizations’
values, and so first failures can become less likely while contagion can become
more likely conditional on a failure. This decreases the circumstances that lead
to first failures, making things better with respect to I, while it increases the cir-
cumstances where there can be contagion, making things worse with respect to II.
Interconnection (III) is not impacted one way or the other as the network pattern
does not change (by assumption). As we increase diversification, organizations
become less dependent on any particular neighbor, so contagions can be harder
to start, but the network becomes more connected, and so the extent of a conta-
gion broadens (at least up to a point where the network is fully connected). This
decreases the circumstances where there can be contagion, making things better
with respect to II, while increasing the potential reach of a contagion conditional
upon one occurring, making things worse with respect to III.
Understanding this structure makes some things clear. First, integration and
diversification affect different ingredients of cascades. Integration affects an or-
ganization’s exposure to others compared to its exposure to its own assets, while
diversification affects how many others one is (directly and indirectly) exposed to.
Second, both integration and diversification improve matters with respect to at
least one of the cascade ingredients above while causing problems along a different
dimension. These tradeoffs result in nonmonotonic effects of diversification and
integration on cascades, as we now examine in detail.
III. How Do Cascades Depend on the Diversification and Integration of
Cross-Holdings?
We now turn to our main results.
We begin with some analytic results and then provide additional results via
simulations for some random network structures.
41Note that it need not be an immediate cross-holder that is the sensitive one. Drops in values
propagate through the network (as captured by the matrix A), and so the second organization to fail
need not be an immediate cross-holder, although that would typically be the case.
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A. The Consequences of Diversification and Integration: Analytic Results
A General Result on Integration
To begin, we prove a general result about how integration affects the extent of
cascades. The result permits any initial cross-holdings C, an arbitrary vector of
costs β, an arbitrary vector of threshold values v, any direct holdings of assets
D, and any underlying asset values p.
Recall that the matrices (C,D) and (C′,D′) are said to be related by a fair
trade at p if v = v′, where v = Ap and v′ = A′p; the matrix A′ is computed as
in (5) with C′ and D′ playing the roles of C and D.42
Proposition 2. Consider (C,D) and (C′,D′) that are related by a fair trade
at p,43 and such that integration increases: A′ij ≥ Aij whenever i 6= j. Every
organization that fails in the cascade at (C,D,p) also fails at (C′,D′,p).
Proposition 2 states that if we integrate cross holdings via fair trades, so that
organizations end up holding more of each other’s investments, then we face more
failures in any given cascade that begins. Thus, benefits of integration comes only
via avoiding first failures. There is a tradeoff: integrating can eliminate some first
failures. However, given that a first failure occurs, it only exacerbates the resulting
cascade.
The reasoning behind the proposition is as follows. As can be seen immediately
from equation (5), when organization i fails and incurs failure costs βi, it is the
ith column of A which determines who (indirectly) pays these costs. Increasing
Aij for all i and j 6= i increases the share of i’s failure costs paid by each other
organization. This increases the negative externality i imposes on each organiza-
tion following its own failure. These other organizations are then more likely to
also fail once i fails and so the number of organizations that fail in the cascade
weakly increases.
A Result on Diversification and Integration
In order to bring diversification into the picture, we specialize the model a bit.
Fixing any given level of diversification and integration a network can typically
be rewired to make it more or much less susceptible to cascades of failures. This
is an obstruction to analytical comparative statics in diversification that hold for
every network. By working with a random graph model that imposes some struc-
ture on the distribution of possible cross-holdings matrices, we can overcome this
challenge and make statements that hold with high probability.44 The random
42We show in the Online Appendix (Section 3.1), that there are circumstances under which organiza-
tions may have incentives to undertake “unfair” trades because of the failure costs.
43The definition of a fair trade ignores any failure costs – i.e., the values before and after a trade are
calculated as if failures do not occur. This offers a clear benchmark.
44When one allows the number of nodes to become arbitrarily large, then various techniques related
to laws of large numbers can be applied to deduce connectedness properties of a random network. Thus,
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graph model is tractable yet flexible with respect to degree distributions, making
it well-suited to the study of diversification. Our analysis of it illustrates some ba-
sic intuitions. We then come back to verify, via simulations, that these intuitions
generalize to random networks that are less analytically tractable.
Before introducing any randomness, suppose G is a fixed matrix with all entries
in {0, 1}; we call this an adjacency matrix of an unweighted, directed graph. The
interpretation is that Gij=1 if organization i has a claim on organization j. To
make it into a cross-holdings matrix, we posit that a fraction c of each organization
is held by other organizations, spread evenly among the di =
∑
j Gji organizations
that hold it. We call di the out-degree of i and analogously define in-degree by
dini =
∑
iGij to be the number of organizations that i holds.
45
Thus, for i 6= j
Cij =
cGij
dj
.
The remaining 1− c of the organization is held by its external shareholders, so
that Ĉii = 1− c.
Holding c fixed, as the out-degree dj increases, the number of organizations
having cross-holdings in j increases, but each of those organizations has lower
cross-holdings in j. Thus, in this model, increasing dj increases diversification
but not integration.
Holding the underlying graph G fixed, as c increases each organization has
lower self-holdings but higher cross-holdings in the other organizations it already
holds. Thus increasing c increases integration but not diversification. This is
made precise in the following lemma shows how increased integration weakly
increases Aij for all i and all j 6= i and strictly increases at least one off-diagonal
entry of A in each column.
Lemma 2. Suppose that Cij = cGij/dj for some adjacency matrix G, with 0 <
c ≤ 12 and each di ≥ 1.46 Then Aii is decreasing in c and Aij is increasing in c:
1) ∂Aii∂c < 0 for each i;
2)
∂Aij
∂c ≥ 0 for all i 6= j;
3)
∂Aij
∂c > 0 for all i 6= j so that there is a path47 from j to i in G.
one can make statements that are likely to hold with high probability when the number of nodes is large.
For surveys of techniques relevant to our analysis, see (Jackson, 2008, Chapter 4) and Newman (2010).
45Note that these terms are intuitive when viewed from the perspective of value flow: out-degree
corresponds how many organizations receive the value that flows out from i by directly holding it. In-
degree describes the number of organizations that i holds, and that therefore send value to i.
46Note that Lemma 2 does not impose any assumptions on the underlying graph G other than each
organization being cross-held by at least one other. Interestingly, the monotonicity identified in Lemma
2 does not always hold for c > 1/2. For such c, there are graph structures where further increases in c
result in the immediate neighbors of i depending less on i. The increase in Aij for non-neighbors of i
can come at the expense of both Aii and Aij for j such that Cij > 0.
47Recall footnote 11.
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Next we introduce the random network model. Fix a degree distribution pi =
(piij), where piij is the fraction of nodes that have in-degree i and out-degree j and
the integer indices satisfy 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n− 1. Let G(pi, n) be the set of all directed
graphs on n that have degree distribution pi. We say pi is feasible for n when
G(pi, n) is nonempty.48 A random network with degree distribution pi is a draw
from G(pi, n) uniformly at random.
For a given pi, we denote by d = max{i : piij > 0 or piji > 0 for some j} the
maximum degree of the network and by d = min{i : piij > 0 or piji > 0 for some j}
the minimum degree. Finally, we define the average directed degree d to be the
expected out-degree of the vertex at the end of a link chosen uniformly at random
from G(pi, n).49 This is a basic measure of average diversification in the graph
that overweights organizations held by many others, and turns out to be the right
one for our purposes. Together, the three parameters d, d, and d operationalize
the notion diversification in this random network model.
Each organization has a single asset of value 1 (so D = I and p = (1, . . . , 1)).
We set all organizations’ thresholds vi to a common v ∈ (0, 1), and set βi = pi,
so that a failing organization has its proprietary asset completely devalued.
Define v˜min =
1−c
1−cd/d and v˜max =
1−c
1−cd/max{d,1} .
50
How does the degree distribution, pi, affect the extent of cascades? Let G be a
random draw of a network with n nodes and degree distribution pi. Let f(pi, n)
be the expected fraction of organizations that fail if the network is given by G
and one proprietary asset value pi is devalued to 0, with i selected uniformly at
random.
Proposition 3.
If one proprietary asset fails (uniformly at random), a non-vanishing fraction of
organizations fail if and only if there are intermediate levels of both integration
and diversification.
In particular, consider a degree distribution pi with associated average directed
degree d, maximum degree d, and minimum degree d; and let (nk) be an infinite
sequence of natural numbers such that pi is feasible for each nk.
1) The fraction of failures tends to 0 (f(pi, nk) → 0) if either of the following
conditions holds:
(ii) d < 1 (diversification is too low), or
(i) d > c(1−c)v˜min−v (diversification is too high, or integration is too high or
low).
48For G(pi, n) to be a nonempty set, some basic relations have to be satisfied by pi: (i) npiij is always
a (nonnegative) integer, since it must be a number of nodes; (ii)
∑
ij ipiij =
∑
ij jpiij , since each is equal
to the number of directed edges in the graph divided by n.
49This depends only on pi. To see this, let φi be the probability that a node of out-degree j is found by
following a randomly chosen edge; we can see that φj =
∑
i ipiij/
∑
j,i ipiij . Now note that d =
∑
jφj .
50These serve as lower and upper bounds, respectively, on organization values, as verified in the proof
of Proposition 3.
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2) The fraction of failures is nonvanishing (lim infk f(pi, nk) > 0) if both of the
following conditions hold:
(i) d > 1 (diversification is not too low), and
(ii) d < c(1−c)v˜max−v (diversification is not too high and integration is interme-
diate).
Proposition 3 documents a non-monotonicity of failures in diversification and
integration. Part (1) shows that if either integration or diversification is extreme
(low or high), then there can be no substantial contagion: 1(i) is satisfied if
diversification is too low, and 1(ii) is satisfied when diversification is high51 or
when integration is high or low (c is close to 0 or 1). In other words, contagion
can occur only if both integration and diversification are intermediate. Part 2
then gives a sufficient condition: upper and lower bounds on the diversification
parameters d and d, respectively,52 specifying the intermediate range in which
contagion occurs.53
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. If c is very low, then no firm holds
enough of its counterparties for contagion to propagate. If c is very high, then
no firm is sufficiently exposed to its own asset for a first failure to happen. So
consider the range where c is intermediate. For random graphs of the type we
study here, once the average directed degree d crosses the threshold 1, the graph
structure changes from many small isolated components of vanishing size to a gi-
ant component of non-vanishing size. It starts out small, but increases in size as
d grows. Thus, if d < 1, contagion to a positive fraction of organizations following
the failure of a single proprietary asset is impossible. At the other extreme, once
d >
⌈
c
v˜min−v
⌉
, a single organization’s failure will not cause a sufficient decrease in
the value of any other organization to induce a second failure. When integration
and diversification are intermediate, so that none of these obstructions to con-
tagion occur, part (2) of the proposition states that a (nonvanishing) fraction of
organizations fail.
The reasoning above makes use of properties of large networks. Regardless of
the parameter values, when there are only a small number of organizations, net-
works with intermediate connectedness are realized with non-trivial probability.
Thus, in settings with very few critical organizations, one has to rely on direct
calculations (e.g., see the core-periphery analysis in Section 4.1).
51Note that as c(1− c) < 1/4 for all c ∈ (0, 1), 1(ii) is always satisfied for all d > 1/(4(v˜min − v))
52Fixing a ratio d/d < 1/c, the right-hand side of 2(ii) is constant in d; in this sense 2(ii) is a true
upper bound on d.
53Observe that when the graph is regular, so that d = d = d, then v˜max and v˜min become identical
and the result becomes fully tight, with no distance between the necessary and the sufficient condition
for contagion.
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B. The Different Roles of Diversification and Integration: Simulations on Random
Networks
We now show that the analytic results of the previous section hold in other
classes of simulated random networks. We also derive some richer insights into
comparative statics in various levels of diversification and integration.
Simulated Random Networks
To illustrate how increased diversification and increased integration affect the
number of organizations that fail in a cascade following the failure of a single
organization’s assets, we specialize the model.
Each organization has exactly one proprietary asset, so that m = n and D = I.
This keeps the analysis uncluttered, and allows us to focus on the network of
cross-holdings.
For simplicity, we also start with asset values of pi = 1 for all organizations,
and have common failure thresholds vi = θvi, for a parameter θ ∈ (0, 1), where
vi is the starting value of organization i when all assets are at value 1. In case an
organization fails it loses its full value, so that βi = vi.
The cross-holdings are derived from an adjacency matrix G with entries in
{0, 1}, where Gij = 1 indicates that i has cross-holdings in j and we set Gii = 0.
Again, a fraction c of each organization is held by other organizations, spread
evenly among the di =
∑
j Gji organizations that hold it as in (3.1.2) The re-
maining 1 − c of the organization is held by its external shareholders, so that
Ĉii = 1− c.
To illustrate the effects of increasing diversification and increasing integration
on cascades we examine a setting where connections between organizations are
formed at random, with each organization having cross-holdings in a random set
of other organizations.
In particular, we form a directed random graph, with each directed link having
probability d/(n− 1), so that the expected indegree and outdegree of any node is
d. More precisely, the adjacency matrix of the graph is a matrix G (usually not
symmetric), where Gij for i 6= j are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables each taking
value 1 with probability d/(n− 1) and 0 otherwise.
To examine the effects of increasing diversification (increasing d) and increasing
integration (increasing c), we simulate an organization’s proprietary asset failing
and record the number of organizations that fail in the resulting cascade.
We follow a simple algorithm:
Step 1. Generate a directed random network G with parameter d as described
above.
Step 2. Calculate the matrix C from G according to (3.1.2), where Ĉii = 0.5.
Step 3. All organizations start with asset values of pi = 1. Calculate organizations’
initial values vi and set vi = θvi for some θ ∈ (0, 1).
26 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
Step 4. Pick an organization i uniformly at random and drop the value (pi) of i’s
proprietary asset to 0.54
Step 5. Assuming all other asset values (pj for j 6= i) stay at 1, calculate the best
equilibrium using the algorithm from Section 2.2.3.
The main outcome variable we track is the number of failures in the best-case
equilibrium.
The Consequences of Diversification: It Gets Worse Before it Gets
Better
For our simulations, we consider n = 100 nodes and work with a grid on ex-
pected degree d between 1 and 20 (varying it increments of 1/3). We work with
values of θ ∈ [0.8, 1].
Our first exercise is to vary the level of diversification (the expected degree d
in the network) while holding other variables fixed and to see how the number of
organizations (out of 100) that fail varies with the diversification.
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate how the proportion of organizations that fail
changes as the level of diversification (d) is varied (fixing integration at c = 0.5).
Figure 2a shows the result for a level of the failure threshold (θ = 0.93) for which
the curves display their typical nonmontonicities clearly. When d is sufficiently
low, 1.5 or below, then we see the percentage of organizations that fail is less than
20. At that level, the network is not connected; a typical organization has direct
or indirect connections through cross-holdings to only a small fraction of others,
and any contagion is typically limited to a small component. As d increases (in
the range of 2 to 6 other organizations) then we see substantial cascades affecting
large percentages of the organizations. In this middle range, the network of cross-
holdings has two crucial properties: it is usually connected55, and organizations
still hold large enough cross-holdings in individual other organizations so that
contagion can occur. This is the “sweet spot” where ingredients II and III are
present and strong – contagion is possible and there is enough interconnection
for a cascade to spread. As we continue to increase diversification, the extent
of cascades is falls, as diversification is now lowering the chance that contagion
occurs. In summary, there is constantly a tradeoff between II and III, but initially
III dominates as diversification leads to dramatic changes in the connectedness of
the network. Then II dominates: once the network is connected, the main limiting
force is the extent to which the failure of one organization sparks failures in others,
which is decreasing with diversification. These three regimes are illustrated in
Figure 3.
54Thus, we are focusing on a case where an organization’s proprietary project is shut down upon
failure. While clearly not the only case of interest, it is a common one in some bankruptcies.
55That is, there is a path in C from any node to any other.
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(a) Effects of diversification: the percentage of
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(b) Effects of diversification for several failure
thresholds: percentage of organizations failing as
a function of expected degree for various levels of
θ (c = 0.5, n = 100).
Figure 2. : How diversification (the average number of other organizations that an
organization cross-holds) affects the percentage of organizations failing, averaged
over 1000 simulations. The horizontal axis corresponds to diversification in terms
of the expected degree in the random network of cross-holdings.
Figure 2b shows how these effects vary with θ. Higher values of θ correspond to
higher failure thresholds, and so it becomes easier to trigger contagions. This leads
to increases in the curves for all levels of diversification. Essentially, increasing θ
leads to a more fragile economy across the board.
The main results in Section 3.1 provide analytical support for the non-monotonicity
due to diversification identified in the simulations and helps identify the forces
behind the non-monotonicity. With low levels of diversification, contagions are
difficult to start and will frequently die out before affecting many organizations.
Condition III is not met, as the network of cross-holdings is not connected. Even
if all organizations directly or independently dependent on the failing organiza-
tion i (those j such that Aij > 0) also fail in the cascade, there are sufficiently few
such organizations that the cascade dies out quickly and is small. As we increase
diversification into intermediate levels, we see an increase in the number of orga-
nizations that fail in a cascade. Since network components are larger, the failure
of any one organization infects more other organizations, and more organizations
are drawn into the cascade. However, as we continue to diversify cross-holdings,
eventually the increased diversification leads to a decrease in exposure of any one
organization to any other, and so the necessary condition II is not met as no
organization depends very much on any other.
Cascades are Larger but Less Frequent in More Integrated Systems
Next, we consider the implications of increased integration in our simple model
on the depth of cascades, as illustrated in Figure 4.
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(a) Low diversification. (b) Medium diversification. (c) High diversification.
Figure 3. : Example random networks (plotted here with undirected edges) for
different levels of diversification. The diagrams demonstrate the transition from
(a) many disconnected components to (b) a large component where each node has
few neighbors to (c) a large component in which each node has many neighbors.
Figures 4a and 4b illustrate how the proportion of organizations that fail
changes as the level of integration is varied from c = 0.1 to 0.5, for two different
values of θ (the fraction of initial value that must be retained for an organization
to avoid failure). As integration is increased the curves all shift upward and we
see increased cascades.
Although the effects in Figures 4a and 4b show unambiguous increases in cas-
cades as integration increases, they work with levels of c ≤ 0.5 for which there
is not so much of a tradeoff. In particular, for c ≤ 0.5 the initial organization
whose asset price is dropped to 0 always fails (in the range of θ ≥ 0.8 considered
in the simulations). As c is increased beyond 0.5, eventually the integration level
begins to help avoid first failures, because each organization is less exposed to the
failure of own proprietary asset. Then we see the tradeoff between I and II that is
present as integration is varied (holding diversification constant, so III – having
to do with the connectedness of the network – is not affected). We can see this
in Figure 5.
Figure 5 shows that as integration increases to very high levels, the percentage
of first failures drops: organizations are so integrated that the drop in the value
of an organization’s own investments is less consequential to it, and so there is no
first failure.
To summarize, increasing integration (as long as it is not already very high)
makes shocks more likely to propagate to neighbors in the financial network and
increases contagion via the mechanism of II. For very high levels of integration,
each organization begins to carry something close to the market portfolio, and so
any first failure caused by the devaluation of a single proprietary asset becomes
less likely.
IV. Alternative Network Structures
Additional insights emerge from examining some other random graph models
of financial interdependencies.
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(a) Five levels of integration and the percentage
of organizations failing as a function of expected
degree (θ = 0.93, n = 100).
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Figure 4. : How integration (the fraction c of a typical portfolio held by other
organizations) affects the percentage of organizations failing, averaged over 1000
simulations. The horizontal axis corresponds to the diversification level (the ex-
pected degree in the random network of cross-holdings). The two figures work
with different failure thresholds and depict how the size of cascades varies with
the level of integration c ranging from 0.1 to 0.5.
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Figure 5. : How integration affects the percentage of “first failures”: the per-
centage of simulations with at least one organization failing, for various levels
of integration c from 0.4 to 0.9, with the horizontal axis tracking diversification
(expected degree) in the network. The failure threshold is constant at θ = 0.8.
A. A Core-Periphery Model
As a stylized representation of the interbank lending market, we examine a core-
periphery model where 10 large organizations are completely connected among
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themselves, and each of 90 smaller organizations has one connection to a random
core organization.56 Each of the ten large core organizations has proprietary
assets with an initial value of 8. Each of the 90 peripheral organizations has
proprietary assets with an initial value of 1.
We then vary different facets of integration:57 the level CCC of cross-holdings of
each core organization by other core organizations, the level CPC of cross-holdings
of each core organization by peripheral organizations, and the level CCP of cross-
holdings of each peripheral organization by core organizations. The remaining
private holdings, Ĉii, are as follows: Ĉii = 1−CCC−CPC for a core organization,
and Ĉii = 1− CCP for a peripheral one.
We first explore what happens when a core organization fails. As we see in the
left-hand part of Figure 6a, the fraction of peripheral organizations that fail along
with the core organization is increasing in CPC . Once the core organizations
become sufficiently integrated among themselves, starting around CCC = .29,
the core organization’s failure begins to cascade to other core organizations, and
then wider contagion occurs. How far this ultimately spreads is governed by the
combination of integration levels.
The more subtle effects are seen in in Figure 6b. The curves are layered in
terms of integration between the core and periphery CPC , with increased inte-
gration leading to higher failure rates due to an initial failure of a peripheral
organization. However, the magnitude of the failure rates is initially increasing in
core integration (CCC < .25) and then decreasing in core integration (CCC > .25).
Initial increases in core-integration enable contagion from one core organization
to another, which leads to widespread cascades. Once core integration becomes
high enough, however, core organizations become less exposed to their own pe-
ripheral organizations, and so then are less prone to fail because of the failure of
a peripheral organization.
B. A Model with Segregation among Sectors
Second, we considered a model that admits segregation (homophily) among
different segments of an economy: for instance among different countries, indus-
tries, or sectors. In this model, there are ten different groups of ten nodes each.
The key feature being varied is the relative intensity of nodes’ connections with
others in their own group compared to other groups. This captures the difference
between integration across industries and integration within industries. Varying
this difference leads to the results captured in Figure 7. An obvious effect is that
56Soromaki et al. (2007) map the US interbank network based on the Fedpayments system. They
identify a clique of 25 completely connected banks (including the very largest ones), and thousands of
less connected peripheral regional and local banks.
57Note that in this model the diversification (degree) structure is essentially fixed given the structure
of ten completely inter-connected organizations and the peripheral ones each having one connection; the
only randomness comes from the random attachment of each peripheral organization to a single core
organization.
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Figure 6. : The consequences of failure in the core-periphery model. The hor-
izontal axis is the fraction of each core organization cross-held by other core
organizations (integration of core to core). In Figure 6a, curves correspond to
different levels of cross-holdings of each core organization by peripheral organi-
zations. In Figure 6b, they correspond to different levels of cross-holdings of
peripheral organizations by core ones. The failure threshold is θ = .98.
increasing homophily can eventually sever connections between groups of organi-
zations and lead to lower contagion. However, as we see in Figure 7, the curves
associated with different levels of diversification (expected degrees d) cross each
other. With medium diversification (e.g., d = 3 or d = 5) there is initially a
higher level of contagion than with higher diversification (e.g., d = 7 or d = 9).
This is because organizations are more susceptible to each other with medium
degrees than with high degrees and the network is still connected enough to per-
mit widespread contagion. However, lower-degree networks fragment at lower
levels of homophily than high degree networks. So at high levels of homophily,
lower-degree networks are actually more robust. For example, once at least 95
percent of relationships are within own group (in expectation), then we see lower
contagion rates with diversifications d = 3, 5 than with d = 7, 9.
C. Power Law Distributions
We also examined networks with more extreme degree distributions, such as a
power-law distribution. Those results are described in detail in Section 4.1 in the
Online Appendix and are in line with the original regular networks. More extreme
exponents in the power law actually lead to smaller contagions on average, but
larger contagions conditional on some high-degree organization’s failure.
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Figure 7. : Ten groups of ten organizations each. The vertical axis is the fraction
of organizations that fail as a function of the homophily. The horizontal axis
is the fraction of expected cross-holdings in same-type organizations. Curves
correspond to different diversification levels (expected degrees d). The failure
threshold is θ = .96.
D. Correlated and Common Assets
An important concern that emerged from the recent financial crisis is that
many organizations may have investments with correlated payoffs, which could
potentially exacerbate contagions, as many organizations’ values may be low at
the same time. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the Online Appendix we examine two
variations with correlated values. As one might expect, increasing correlation
increases the failure rate. The more interesting part is that the increase occurs
abruptly at a particular level of correlation.
We also examine a model in which organizations have some holdings of both an
idiosyncratic and a common asset, with the possibility of leverage in holdings of
the common asset. Some organizations are long the asset and others can be short.
This results in some interesting patterns in cascades: even low leverage levels
can lead to increased cascades by increasing organizations’ exposures. However,
organizations that are short the common asset might escape a cascade triggered
by a shock to that asset.
V. Illustration with European Debt Cross-Holdings
We close the paper with an illustration of the model with data on the cross-
holdings of debt among six European countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain). We include this as a proof of concept, and emphasize
that the crude estimates that we use for cross-holdings make this noisy enough
that we do not see the conclusions as robust, but merely as illustrative of the
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methodology.58
We take the fundamental asset owned by each country to be its fiscal stream;
by exchanging cross-holdings, countries acquire holdings whose value depends on
the value of others’ fiscal streams as well as on their own. We model failure as
being triggered by a certain percentage loss in the value of a country’s aggregate
holdings. In the simulations, when a country “fails,” it defaults on 50 percent
of its obligations to foreign countries – an arbitrary choice, but not unfounded,
as we see from the writedown of Greek debt. Such losses may arise for various
reasons: discontinuous changes in government policies of how to make use of fiscal
streams; government decisions not to honor obligations (at which point it makes
sense to do so discontinuously); discontinuities in the fiscal streams themselves
(due to strikes, discontinuous changes in foreign investments, bank runs, and so
forth). Indeed, all of these phenomena were observed in the recent Greek crisis.
Finally, for the purposes of this illustrative exercise, we treat these countries as a
closed system with no holdings by other countries outside of these six.
A. The Data
Data on the cross-holdings are for the end of December 2011 from the BIS (Bank
for International Settlements) Quarterly Review (Table 9B). The data used for
this exercise are the consolidated foreign claims of banks from one country on
debt obligations of another country. The data looks at the immediate borrower
rather than the final borrower59 when a bank from a country different from the
final borrower serves as an intermediary.60
This gives following raw cross-holdings matrix, where the column represents
the country whose debt is being held and the row is the country which holds
that debt. So, for example, through their banking sectors Italy owes France
$329,550M, while France only owes Italy $40,311M.
58See Upper (2011) for a nice review of the empirical literature simulating the effects of shocks to
financial systems. Explicit losses due to bankruptcy are not usually considered in this literature, but an
important exception is Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006), who find that these costs can make a large
difference to the extent of contagion in simulation analysis. Our approach is well-suited to developing
a deeper analysis of the propagation of discontinuities, as we examine the various levels of a cascade –
which failures cause which others. This is illustrated in this section.
59Which basis is appropriate is discussed in section 10 of the Online Appendix.
60For illustrative purposes, we examine holdings at a country level, so that all holdings of Italian debt
by banks or other investors in France are treated as being held by the entity “France,” and we suppose
that substantial losses by banks and investors in France would lead to a French default on national debt.
It would be more accurate to disaggregate and build a network of all organizations and investors, if such
data were available.
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
(France) (Germany) (Greece) (Italy) (Portugal) (Spain)
(France) 0 198, 304 39, 458 329, 550 21, 817 115, 162
(Germany) 174, 862 0 32, 977 133, 954 30, 208 146, 096
(Greece) 1, 960 2, 663 0 444 51 292
(Italy) 40, 311 227, 813 2, 302 0 3, 188 26, 939
(Portugal) 6, 679 2, 271 8, 077 2, 108 0 21, 620
(Spain) 27, 015 54, 178 1, 001 29, 938 78, 005 0

.
To convert the above matrix into our fractional cross-holdings matrix, C, we
then estimate the total amount of debt issued by each country. To do this, we
estimate the ratio of total debt held outside the issuing country by 1/3, in line with
estimates of by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). Then, the formula A = Ĉ(I−C)−1
implies that A is:

(France) (Germany) (Greece) (Italy) (Portugal) (Spain)
(France) 0.71 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.11
(Germany) 0.18 0.72 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.14
(Greece) 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Italy) 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.70 0.03 0.05
(Portugal) 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.67 0.02
(Spain) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.68

.
The matrix A can be pictured as a weighted directed graph, as in Figure 8. The
arrows show the way in which decreases in value flow from country to country.
For example, the arrow from Greece to France represents the value of France’s
claims on Greek assets, and thus how much France is harmed when Greek debt
loses value. The areas of the ovals represent the value of each country’s direct
holdings of primitive assets. All dependencies of less than 5 percent have been
excluded from Figure 8 (but appear in the table above).
We treat the investments in primitive assets as if each country holds its own
fiscal stream, which is used to pay for the debt, and presume that the values of
these fiscal streams are proportional to GDP. Thus, D = I and p is proportional
to the vector of countries’ GDPs.61 Normalizing Portugal’s GDP to 1, the initial
values in 2011 are v0 = Ap,
61We work in the scale of GDPs – that is, we do not carry around an explicit constant of proportionality
relating the value of the fiscal streams p to the value of GDP; we simply take the entries of the vector
p to be the GDP values.
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Figure 8. : Interdependencies in Europe: The matrix A, describing how much
each country ultimately depends on the value of others’ debt. The widths of the
arrows are proportional to the sizes of the dependencies with dependencies less
than 5 percent excluded; the area of the oval for each country is proportional to
its underlying asset values.

0.71 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.11
0.18 0.72 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.14
0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.12 0.03 0.70 0.03 0.05
0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.67 0.02
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.20 0.14 0.68
 ·

11.6
14.9
1.3
9.2
1.0
6.3
 =

12.7 (France)
14.9 (Germany)
0.8 (Greece)
9.4 (Italy)
0.9 (Portugal)
7.1 (Spain)
 .
B. Cascades
To illustrate the methodology, we consider a simple scenario. The failure thresh-
olds are set to θ multiplied by 2008 values.62 If a country fails, then the loss in
value is vi/2, so that half the value of its debt is lost.
We examine the best equilibrium values for various levels of θ. Greece’s value
has already fallen by well more than ten percent, and so it has hit its failure point
for all of the values of θ. We then raise θ to various values and see which cascades
occur.
We see that Portugal is the first failure to be triggered by a contagion. Although
it is not particularly exposed to Greek debt directly, the fact that its GDP has
dropped substantially means that it is triggered once we get to θ = .935. Once
Portugal fails, then Spain fails due to its poor initial value and its exposure to
Portugal. Then the large size of Spain, and the exposure of France and Germany
62Those values are calculated in the same way as the values above, being proportional to 2008 GDP
values instead of 2011 and again normalized by setting Portugal’s 2011 GDP to 1.
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Table 1—: Hierarchies of Cascades in the Best Equilibrium Algorithm, as a Func-
tion of the Failure Threshold θ.
Value of θ 0.9 0.93 0.935 0.94
First Failure Greece Greece Greece Greece, Portugal
Second Failure Portugal Spain
Third Failure Spain France
Fourth Failure France, Germany Germany, Italy
Fifth Failure Italy
Source: Authors’ calculations
to Spain cause them to fail. Pushing θ up to .94 causes Portugal to fail directly,
and then leads to a similar sequence. (Increasing θ further would not change the
ordering; it would just cause some countries to fail at earlier waves.) Interestingly,
Italy is the last in each case: this is due to its low exposure to others’ debts. Its
GDP is not particularly strong, but it does not hold much of the dent of the other
countries, with the exceptions of France and Germany.
Clearly the above exercise is based on rough numbers, ad hoc estimates for the
default thresholds, and a closed (six country) world. Nonetheless, it illustrates
the simplicity of the approach and makes it clear that much more accurate simu-
lations could be run with access to precise cross-holdings data, default costs and
thresholds.63
We re-emphasize that the cascades are (hopefully!) off the equilibrium path,
but that understanding the dependency matrix and the hierarchical structure of
potential cascades can improve policy interventions.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Based on a simple model of cross-holdings among organizations that allows
discontinuities in values, we have examined cascades in financial networks. We
have highlighted several important features. First, diversification and integration
are usefully distinguished as they have different effects on financial contagions.
Second, both diversification and integration entail tradeoffs in how they affect
contagion. These tradeoffs result in nonmonotonic effects where middle ranges
are the most dangerous with respect to cascades of failures. The tradeoffs can also
be related to important realistic aspects of a network, such as its core-periphery
and segregation structure.
A fully endogenous study of the network of cross-holdings and of asset holdings
is a natural next step.64 We illustrate some moral hazard issues in the Online
63Of course, a linear cross-holdings structure is also an important simplification. A further refinement
would involve modeling the holdings in greater detail, and solving for the ultimate dependencies of
organizations on assets (analogous to computing the A matrix) in that more complicated world.
64For some analyses of network formation in other financial settings, see Babus (2013), Ibragimov,
Jaffee and Walden (2011), Cohen-Cole, Patacchini and Zenou (2012), and Baral (2012). These can cut in
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Appendix (Section 3): organizations can have incentives to affect both bankruptcy
costs and thresholds in socially inefficient ways. These considerations suggest that
endogenizing the basic structures of our model will be delicate and that a simple
general equilibrium approach will not suffice. This presents interesting challenges
for future research.
The approach we have outlined could be used to inform policy. For exam-
ple, counterfactual scenarios can be run using the algorithm. To determine the
marginal effect of saving a set of organizations, the failure costs of those organi-
zations can be set to zero and the algorithm run with and without their failure
costs. This identifies a new set of organizations to fail in a cascade conditional
on the intervention. This set of organizations can be compared to the set of
organizations that fail under other interventions, including doing nothing. It is
important to note that the aforementioned exercise must be repeated for any set
of underlying asset prices that are of interest. As underlying asset prices change
the differences between organizations’ values and their failure thresholds change.
These changes may be highly correlated depending on the underlying asset hold-
ings. When many organizations have similar exposures to underlying assets, they
will be relatively close to their failure frontiers at the same time, and so the first
(and subsequent) waves of failures may change drastically for fairly small changes
in asset prices.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
One representation of A is as the following infinite sum, known as the Neumann
series:
(A1) A = Ĉ
∞∑
p=0
Cp = Ĉ + Ĉ
∞∑
p=1
Cp
It follows immediately that Aii ≥ Ĉii and that there is equality if and only if
there are no cycles involving i. Part (2) can be proved by considering Ĉ and C
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such that Ĉii =  for all i and Cij = (1 − )/(n − 1) for all i and all j. Taking
→ 0, we have Ĉii → 0 but A tends to the matrix with all entries equal to 1/n.
Proof of Proposition 1.
As any trade involving organization i must change composition of i’s depen-
dency on underlying assets, after any trade there must exists a price vector p′′
within an  neighborhood of λp, such that vi(p
′′,C′,D′|Z = ∅) 6= vi(p′′,C,D|Z =
∅) = vi. For the Proposition to be false, it must then be that vi(p′′,C′,D′|Z =
∅) > vi(p′′,C,D|Z = ∅). Define price p′ such that 12p′′ + 12p′ = λp. As||p′ − λp||1 = ||p′′ − λp||1 and p′′ is within an  neighborhood of λp, p′ is
also within an  neighborhood of λp.
By the linearity of organizations’ values, absent any failure, and as the trade
was fair
1
2
vi(p
′′,C′,D′|Z = ∅) + 1
2
vi(p
′,C′,D′|Z = ∅) = vi(λp,C′,D′|Z = ∅) = vi,
and
vi = vi(λp,C,D|Z = ∅) =
1
2
vi(p
′′,C,D|Z = ∅) + 1
2
vi(p
′,C,D|Z = ∅).
Thus as vi(p
′′,C′,D′|Z = ∅) > vi(p′′,C,D|Z = ∅),
vi(p
′,C′,D′|Z = ∅) < vi < vi(p′,C,D|Z = ∅).
Proof of Proposition 2.
Following the failures of organizations Zk−1, the value of organization i is:
vi(Zk−1) =
n∑
j /∈Zk−1
AijDjkpk +
n∑
j∈Zk−1
Aij(Djkpk − βj) = vi(∅)−
n∑
j∈Zk−1
Aijβj .
As fair trades hold constant vi(∅), this equation shows that the value of orga-
nization i given failures Zk−1 is weakly decreasing in Aij for all j 6= i. Holding
fixed the hierarchies in which all other organizations fail, after a weak increase
in Aij for all i and all j 6= i, if organization i failed in hierarchy k it will now
fail (weakly) sooner in hierarchy k′ ≤ k and if organization i did not fail in any
hierarchy it might now fail in some hierarchy.
Moreover, as failures are complementary, if organization i fails strictly sooner in
hierarchy k′ weakly more organizations will be included in all subsequent failure
sets Zk′′ , for all k′′ > k′. This is because more failure costs are summed over in the
above equation when calculating a organization’s value in each failure hierarchy.
Proof of Lemma 2:
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Let C = Gd−1 and note that by the Neumann series we may write
A = (1− c)
∞∑
t=0
ctC
t
∂A
∂c
= (1− c)
∞∑
t=1
tct−1Ct −
∞∑
t=0
ctC
t
= −I +
∞∑
t=1
(t(1− c)− c)ct−1Ct.
Since c ≤ 12 , every term in the summation over t is nonnegative. Moreover,
ct−1Ct has a strictly positive entry whenever there is a path of length t from i
to j in C, or equivalently in G. This shows claims 2 and 3 in the proposition.
To verify claim 1, note that every column of A sums to 1. Claim 3 along with
the assumption that every node in G has at least one neighbor shows that every
column has an off-diagonal entry that strictly increases in c; and no off-diagonal
entry decreases by claim 2. So the diagonal entry strictly decrease in c.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We begin the proof with a simple lemma, proved in Section 11 of the Online
Appendix.
Lemma 3. The values v˜max and v˜min are upper and lower bounds, respectively,
for the value of any organization.
We also introduce some terminology. Recall from Section 1.1 that if Cji > 0
there is an edge from i to j – corresponding to value flowing from i to j. We
adopt the same convention for G: we say there is an edge from i to j if Gji = 1,
and define paths analogously – recall footnote 11. Fixing a graph G and a node i,
the fan-out of i, denoted R+(i), is the set of nodes j such that there is a directed
path from i to j in G. These are the j’s that have direct or indirect cross-holdings
in i. Throughout, G is drawn uniformly at random from G(pi, nk), with nk left
implicit.
If 1(i) in the proposition’s statement holds (d < 1), then by Theorem 1 of
Cooper and Frieze (2004), for any ε > 0 and large enough k, with probability at
least 1 − ε there are at no nodes having a fan-out larger than εnk. Since only
nodes in R+(i) can fail following the failure of i, this proves that for large enough
k, we havef(pi, nk) ≤ ε.
Suppose 1(ii) in the proposition’s statement holds. Fix ε > 0. Suppose that pro-
prietary asset i (belonging to organization i) is the one that is randomly selected
to fail. Take any j such that Gji > 0. The amount by which the value of organi-
zation j falls is Aji. By the Neumann series (equation 6), Aji ≤ (1− c)c/d+Rji,
where Rji = (1− c)
(∑∞
p=2 C
p
)
ji
accounts for the value flowing along paths from
i to j in C other than the edge from i to j with weight Cji – i.e., paths of length
2 or longer. The following is proved in Section 11 of the Online Appendix:
Lemma 4. For any ε, if k is large enough, then with probability at least 1 − ε,
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simultaneously for all j such that Gji = 1, we have Rji = (1−c)
(∑∞
p=2 C
p
)
ji
≤ ε.
By 1(ii) in the proposition’s statement, and Lemma 3, (1− c)c/d < v˜min − v ≤
vj − v. So, for small enough ε, a failure of i, which reduces j’s value by at most
(1 − c)c/d + ε, is not enough to cause the failure of any counterparty j, and so
there is no contagion.
Now suppose 2(i) and 2(ii) hold, and again fix ε > 0. Let i be the index of
the first asset to fail. By Theorems 2 and 3 of Cooper and Frieze (2004), because
d > 1, with probability at least ε, the node i has fan-out of size at least εnk, for
small enough ε and large enough k. Suppose that organization j has holdings
in organization i (i.e., Gji > 0) and recall that if organization i fails (losing all
remaining value, since βi = vi), organization j’s value will decrease by Aji. By
the Neumann series (equation 6) Aji ≥ c(1−c)d , deterministically.65 Organization
j will therefore fail, following the failure of organization i if:
vi − c(1− c)
d
< v,
which is guaranteed by d < c(1−c)v˜max−v . This argument applies again to all the
neighbors of j once it fails; iterating this argument, we find that the whole set
R+(i) fails. Thus, in the event (probability ≥ ε) that node i has fan-out of size
at least εnk, at least εnk nodes fail, which establishes that f(pi, nk) ≥ ε2 for large
enough k.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
65This lower bound on Aji can be found by considering only the direct effect of j’s cross-holdings in
i and not any further feedbacks.
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1 More on Cross-Holdings Matrices and the Induced
Dependencies
In this section, we present a three-organization example to illustrate more about how the A
and the C matrices can differ.
Recall our simple example from Section IG (see Figure 1). There are two organizations,
i = 1, 2, each of which has a 50% stake in the other organization. The associated cross-
holdings matrix C and the dependency matrix A are as follows. (Recall that Ĉii is equal to
1 minus the sum of the entries in column i of C.)
C =
(
0 0.5
0.5 0
)
Ĉ =
(
0.5 0
0 0.5
)
A = Ĉ(I−C)−1 =
(
2
3
1
3
1
3
2
3
)
.
A slightly richer example of potential differences between the cross-holdings and induced
dependencies is as follows, with three organizations.
C =
 0 0.75 0.750.85 0 0.10
0.10 0 0
 A = Ĉ(I−C)−1 =
 0.18 0.13 0.150.77 0.83 0.66
0.05 0.04 0.19

The weighted graphs of the matrix C + Ĉ and the associated A are shown in Figure 2,
illustrating the substantial differences.
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Figure 1: An illustration of cross-holdings in the two-organization example. The arrows
indicate how a dollar of income arriving at one of the organizations is allocated between its
direct holders and other organizations. Dollars that stay within the system are further split
up. The A matrix describes how they are ultimately allocated.
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(a) Weighted graph of C + Ĉ.
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Figure 2: The widths of the edges are proportional to the sizes of cross-holdings; the arrows
point in the direction of the flow of assets: from the organization that is held and to the
holder. Edges pointing outside the graph in (a) reflect the private (outside) shareholders’
holdings. The cross-holdings and outside holdings measured by C + Ĉ can be very differ-
ent from the dependency matrix A, which measures how each organization’s market value
ultimately depends on the assets held by each organization.
First, note that organization 1 is almost a holding company: It is mostly owned by other
organizations, and so the second two entries of the first row of A are much smaller than the
corresponding entries in C + Ĉ, indicating that not much of the value of organization 1’s
direct holdings accrue to its private shareholders.
Also, we see that the outside shareholders of organization 2 ultimately (i.e., according to
the A matrix) claim 66% of organization 3’s direct asset holdings, even though organization 2
has only 10% of the shares of organization 3 in cross-holdings (per the C matrix). Intuitively,
as organization 2 cross-holds 85% of organization 1, it follows that organization 2’s outside
shareholders indirectly have claims to organization 1’s large direct stakes in both organization
2 and organization 3.
2
2 Debt and Other Liabilities
Throughout the paper we suppose that organizations’ values depend linearly on the organi-
zations they have holdings in, with positive slope coefficients. Debt contracts do not induce
this functional form in the domain where organizations can meet the face values of their
obligations. But, as we emphasize in Section IE, our analysis is centered on situations in
which organizations cannot meet the face values of their obligations and must ration their
counterparties. In this region, our linear model of dependencies approximates cross-holding
of debt.1
Also, we emphasize that the discontinuous failure costs need not be triggered at the point
where the value of an organization first falls below the face value of debt. There can be some
regime of orderly write-down until a threshold where there is a disruption in the ability of the
organization to operate, below which its value is reduced discontinuously, entering a regime
of disorderly default. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
Value of i’s debt 
holding in j 
0 
Value of j’s proprietary asset 
(𝑝𝑗) 
𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝑫𝒑 − 𝒃 𝒗 𝑗 
Disorderly 
default 
Write-  
downs 
Full debt 
value 
Figure 3: As the value of organization j’s proprietary asset pj decreases, a first threshold is
reached at which the organization cannot pay the full face value of its liabilities. We focus
on values of pj below this threshold. After the threshold comes a region of orderly default,
in which each debt holder i absorbs write-downs on the value of j’s debt. As the remaining
value is rationed, i’s value decreases linearly in pj until a second threshold is crossed, which
we refer to as j’s failure threshold. This can be interpreted as the point at which j’s assets
are (partially) liquidated. The resulting failure costs cause a discontinuous decrease in the
value of debt holdings in j.
1It is not essential that all organizations be in the linear regime. If there are organizations that are
“safe” and are able to pay the face value of their debts, one can model claims on them as claims on just
another fundamental asset. And obligations that an organization j in the write-downs regime has to a “safe”
organization can be viewed as j’s obligation to an outside shareholder. In other words, since reductions in
value do not feed through safe organizations, those organizations can be treated as exogenous or external to
the network.
3
More generally, the model is easily adapted to other sorts of liabilities in addition to the
linear cross-holdings that we have mainly been discussing. These could include any sort of
contractual agreements, including ones contingent on the market value of the organizations
(for instance, real debt commitments cannot exceed the organization’s market value if there
is limited liability). The basic strategy is to modify the equations for Vi to incorporate how
the agreements contribute to organizations’ book values (taking care to subtract liabilities
as needed, so that book values do not become arbitrarily inflated). Then the fixed point of
the book value equations can be computed, and the effects of various shocks studied in such
a richer system.
3 Endogenously High Failure Costs and Thresholds
due to Moral Hazard
Whether an organization fails depends on its failure threshold. The impact that its failure
has on other organizations depends on its failure costs. If organizations have some control
over their failure thresholds and costs, then we might hope that they would choose to lower
them, reducing both the likelihood and the costs of failure. We show in this section that, on
the contrary, organizations can actually have incentives to increase both their failure costs
and thresholds.
3.1 Organization Values Can Be Endogenous
Our previous analysis has assumed that exchanges of cross-holdings or assets between or-
ganizations occur through fair trades at the current asset prices (recall Section IIIA). That
was useful for illustrating the workings of the model and identifying effects of diversification
and integration. However, the value to an organization of a trade depends not only on the
value of the bundle of assets being received, but also on the implications of the trade for
ensuing failures. Solvent or liquid organizations may have incentives to bail out insolvent or
illiquid ones in order to avert a contagion (as pointed out, for example, by Leitner (2005)). 2
For instance, it can be that by relinquishing some holdings (in either assets or in another
organization) an organization’s value actually increases! This means that we cannot value
organizations based solely on their implied underlying asset holdings but also need to con-
sider the solvency of all other organizations. Trades can be “incentive compatible” when
they are not “fair” (as evaluated by pricing the traded assets at the prices p and neglecting
failure costs).
2Leitner (2005) argues that incentives for interconnected organizations to bail one another out can help
them provide insurance to each other when they otherwise would not be able to commit to doing so, and that
this provides an efficiency benefit from financial interconnections that can be traded off against increased
systemic risk.
4
We first illustrate the endogeneity of values through a simple example, and then explore
the associated moral hazard issues.
3.2 An Example
Consider a world with two assets and two organizations. We begin with a case where
asset holdings are D1∙ = (1, 0), D2∙ = (0, 1). Initial cross-holdings are C1∙ = (0, 1/2) and
C2,∙ = (1/2, 0): Each organization has a one-half stake in the other (and Ĉii = 1/2).
From equation (5) in the paper, it is easily verified that the organizations’ indirect hold-
ings of the underlying assets are given by
A =
(
2
3
1
3
1
3
2
3
)
.
With the initial cross-holdings, organization 1 receives 2/3 of asset 1’s value while orga-
nization 2 receives 1/3. The situation for asset 2 is the reverse.
Let both asset 1 and asset 2 have price p1 = p2 = 10. Thus, without any failure costs,
the (market) values of the organizations would be v1 = v2 = 10.
We let v1 = 0 and v2 = 11; let organization 2’s failure costs be β2 = 6. This means
that if there are no changes in cross-holdings, from (5) the values of the two organizations
are 8 and 6.3 Suppose now that organization 1 can make a transfer to organization 2. If
organization 1 were to make a transfer of 1 unit to organization 2, organization 2 would not
fail and the values of the two organizations would be 9 and 11. Thus by making a transfer to
organization 2, organization 1 is able to increase its value from 8 to 9! Such a payment might
be a direct transfer of cash, or it could be implemented through a trade in underlying assets
or cross-holdings. For example, organization 1 might simply give organization 2 an increased
stake in organization 1.4 In any case, organization 1 is incentivized to “save” organization
2.5
Suppose we now extend the above example to permit organization 2 to have some control
over its failure costs (β2) and failure threshold (v2). For simplicity, we suppose that orga-
nization 2 can choose from β2 ∈ {0, 5, 10} and from v2 ∈ {10, 11, 12, 13, 14}, and that there
are no direct costs or benefits associated with the choice. Note that organization 2 can avoid
failure without any intervention from organization 1 by choosing v2 = 10. However, we will
see that such a choice is not in the best interests of organization 2.
3Values before failure costs are 10 for both organizations. Organization 2 therefore fails, and its failure
cost of 6 reduces the effective value of its proprietary asset from 10 to 4. Organization 2 ultimately incurs
2/3 of this loss, while organization 1 incurs 1/3.
4One of the ways in which organization 1 might “save” organization 2 is to simply take over organization
2.
5All the parameter values in the example can be varied slightly without generating a discontinuous change
in the organizations’ optimal choices. In this sense the example presented is not a knife-edge case.
5
We assume organization 1 will “save” organization 2 if doing so weakly increases organi-
zation 1’s value. If organization 2 needs saving (v2 > 10), 1’s value after just saving 2 will
be v′1 = 10− (v2 − 10), while its value will be 10 − (β2/3) if it does not save organization 2.
Organization 1 will therefore save organization 2 if and only if v2 > 10 and
β2
3
> (v2 − 10).
The left-hand side is the increase in value organization 1 enjoys if organization 2 remains
solvent, and the right-hand side is the cost of saving organization 2—the transfer 1 must make
to 2 in order for 2 to remain solvent. Table 1 below shows the transfers that organization
1 will make to organization 2 for the different values of v2 and β2 that organization 2 can
choose. These choices of v2 and β2 then result in different values for organization 2, as shown
in Table 2:
Failure Costs β2
0 5 10
10 0 0 0
Failure 11 0 1 1
Threshold v2 12 0 0 2
13 0 0 3
14 0 0 0
Table 1: Transfer made from 1 to 2
Failure Costs β2
0 5 10
10 10 10 10
Failure 11 10 11 11
Threshold v2 12 10 6 2/3 12
13 10 6 2/3 13
14 10 6 2/3 3 1/3
Table 2: Value of 2 after the transfer
As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, for a fixed failure threshold, organization 2 is saved only
when its failure costs are sufficiently large. Conditional on being saved, 2’s value is increasing
in its failure threshold; conditional on not being saved, organization 2’s value is weakly
decreasing in its failure threshold. For sufficiently high failure thresholds, organization 2
is never saved. And for sufficiently low failure thresholds, organization 2 doesn’t fail. To
maximize its utility after a bailout in this example, organization 2 must set the highest
failure costs it can, and then carefully choose its failure threshold so that organization 1 is
just incentivized to save it. As the table demonstrates, this requires organization 2 choosing
a failure threshold of 13 and failure costs of 10.
Of course, if organizations can commit not to bail each other out, then these moral
hazard problems can be avoided. However, firms have a fiduciary obligation to maximize
shareholder value, even if this involves bailing out a failing organization they have a stake
in. This can make it difficult for organizations to commit not to bail out one another. And
absent a no-bailouts commitment device, organizations can have strong incentives to increase
their failure costs and manipulate their failure thresholds.
The moral hazard problem in this example occurs absent any intervention by the gov-
ernment. Failure costs alone are sufficient for a moral hazard problem to arise. 6 It arises
6This moral hazard problem also distorts organizations’ investment decisions, in terms of both their
investments in risky projects and their investments in cross-holdings.
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because organizations do not fully bear their failure costs. As other organizations pay some
of organization i’s failure costs (βi) through the devaluation of their holdings in i, these other
organizations will be prepared to expend resources bailing out i. As the proportion of i’s
failure costs that i pays is given by Aii, a natural measure of the severity of the moral hazard
problem is 1 − Aii. When 1 − Aii = 0, there is no moral hazard problem. Moreover, the
extent of the moral hazard problem is monotonic in 1−Aii in the following sense: If 1−Aii is
increased by redistributing shares of i from outside shareholders to other organizations, such
that all other organizations’ claims on i weakly increase, any organization that previously
would have bailed out i faces weakly stronger incentives to bail out i, while organizations
who previously would not have found it profitable to bail out i may now find it profitable to
do so.
We saw in Section IIA that cascades of failure can occur, amplifying and propagating
shocks if failure costs are sufficiently large and failure thresholds are sufficiently high. The
analysis in this section has identified an endogenous mechanism through which organizations
are willing to invest in increasing their failure costs and possibly their failure thresholds. Al-
though such investments are valuable to an organization only in the event that it is bailed
out, and in an uncertain world such bailouts may or may not be forthcoming, the mis-
alignment of incentives due to the moral hazard problem can nevertheless result in systems
endogenously conducive to cascades of failure.
4 Additional Simulations: Alternative Degree Distri-
butions and Correlations in Holdings
In this section we describe some additional simulations, exploring alterations of the basic
model that complement the simulations of Section IV.
4.1 Power-Law Distributions
First we let the out-degree distribution for the organizations follow a (truncated) power law
instead of modeling Erdos-Renyi random graphs, as in our earlier simulations. Specifically
we let the outdegree dout of each organization be drawn independently from a distribution
p(dout) = a ∙ d−γout, where γ is the power-law parameter and a is a normalizing constant that
ensures p(dout) is a probability distribution. If according to a draw from this power-law
distribution, organization i has an out-degree of 6, we randomly give six other organizations
a c/6 share of i.
The objective of these simulations is to study the effect of the parameter γ on the number
of failures. However, to prevent the effect of γ being conflated with changes to the expected
degree d, we hold the expected degree constant by truncating the degree distribution. In
other words, we pick a maximum possible degree and adjust it, for each level of γ, to hold
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the expected degree d constant.7
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Figure 4: How the average number of failures changes with the power-law parameter γ
for different expected degrees, averaged over 10,000 simulations. The failure threshold is
constant at θ = 0.95, and the degree of integration is c = 0.4.
As γ increases, the number of failures decreases; there are typically larger effects as the
expected degree, d, is increased even slightly. This is true both when the out-degree follows
a power law and when the in-degree follows a power law.
4.2 Correlated Asset Holdings
To explore the impact of organizations’ asset holdings being correlated, we run simulations
where, instead of simply sending one organization’s underlying asset value to zero and keep-
ing all others at value 1, we do the following. We drop one organization’s direct asset holdings
by s%, and we also decrease some other organizations’ assets by s%, where any other orga-
nization is included with a probability ρ. As ρ nears 1, all the assets drop together, whereas
when ρ nears 0, only the one organization fails. As we increase ρ, we increase the number of
organizations that fail together.8
7As the truncation can occur only at integer maximum degrees, we vary the maximum degree between
the integer just above and just below the ideal truncation point. In all cases the normalizing constant adjusts
to ensure p(dout) is a probability distribution.
8This is a very simple way of introducing correlated shocks. A more detailed but nonetheless straight-
forward way of incorporating correlated positions would be to model holdings of many different assets that
are held by multiple organizations. We could even permit people to hold negative amounts of an asset to
represent shorting, although the total net position in the system must remain constant. See Section 4.3 in
this appendix.
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Figure 5: How correlation in asset holdings affects the percentage of organizations failing,
averaged over 5000 simulations. The horizontal axis indexes the correlation in asset holdings,
measured by the proportion of organizations that suffer a shock simultaneously.
From Figures 5a and 5b, increasing the correlation of asset holdings to even a low level
from a baseline of an uncorrelated system can result in relatively small shocks having highly
uncertain outcomes that often result in very many failures.
4.3 Common Asset Holdings
In this section, we will start with the baseline simulation model for 100 organizations, with
average degree d = 3 and a level of integration of c = 0.4, and adjust it in the following ways.
First, we let each organization have holdings of two underlying assets: its own proprietary
asset, and a common asset that all organizations have some (possibly negative) holdings
of.9 Each organization’s holdings of the assets are determined in the following way. An
organization i is selected uniformly at random and given a positive holding, xi, in the common
asset, drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval [0 , `]. The parameter ` represents
leverage, for reasons that will become clear. Next, a new organization is selected uniformly
at random from the remaining organizations. This organization is the counter-party to i,
and is assigned holding −xi in the common asset. This process repeats without replacement
(with the uniform draws of xi independent across these repetitions) until all organizations
have been assigned a position in the common asset. By construction, the net holdings of
the common asset are 0 thus far. To make the net position positive, and equal to 1, we
give each organization an additional quantity 1/n of the common asset. At this point, the
organizations will have different underlying asset values, some of which may be negative (if
9While our baseline model considers positive holdings, the value equations are valid provided that I−C
is invertible.
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` > 1/n). To equalize the values of all organizations’ underlying asset portfolios, we also
give each organization a holding of a proprietary asset whose price is chosen such that the
overall value of its underlying asset holdings is 1. After doing this, the sum of the values of
all proprietary assets will be 99, as the net value of the common asset holdings is 1.
We then construct the cross-holdings matrix. To permit the existence of groups of or-
ganizations that are highly interconnected, we assign organizations to 10 groups and permit
the probability of a link within a group to differ from the probability of a link across groups
(as in the homophily simulations of Section IVB). We also correlate the assignment of or-
ganizations to these groups with their common asset holdings. To do this, we first take a
weighted average of each organization’s common asset holdings and an identically and inde-
pendently uniformly distributed random variable on [−`, `], which we call a noise term. The
weight we place on common asset holdings is ρ, and the weight we place on the noise term
is 1 − ρ. Then organizations are grouped according to the decile of this weighted average.
So, for ρ = 1, organizations are ranked according to their common asset holdings and then
assigned to a group based on the decile in this ranking. When ρ = 0, assignment to groups
is independent of common asset holdings. In this way, ρ controls the correlation between
group assignments and common asset holdings.
We now form the random graph of cross-holdings among the organizations. The prob-
ability of a link within-group is weakly higher than the probability of a link across groups.
These probabilities are varied while holding the expected degree constant, as in the ho-
mophily simulations. When the parameter h (standing for homophily) is 1, the probability
of a link across groups is 0. More generally, the probability of a within-group link is propor-
tional to h, while the probability of an across-group link is proportional to 1 − h. The link
probabilities are adjusted to keep the expected degree constant.
We then shock the value of the common asset and run simulations (1000 iterations for
each of various combinations of the parameters `, ρ, h). We look at the effect of correlating
risks in a system with homophily/segregation by holding h and ` constant and comparing
ρ = 0 to ρ > 0. We also study the effect of reducing the leverage parameter, `, while holding
the other parameters constant. This reduces organizations’ average positions in the common
asset, but also makes their exposures to the common asset more correlated (with perfect
correlation when ` = 0).
Interestingly, for the parameter ranges considered, adjusting the correlation of common
asset positions within-group (by changing ρ) has little impact regardless of homophily. In
contrast, adjusting the leverage parameter has a substantial impact. For even small shocks
to the common asset of 5 percent, large cascades occur (across the range of other parameters)
for ` > 1.5. Note that for these higher levels of leverage, the correlation in exposure to the
common asset is actually lower.
The threshold value of the parameter ` for which a large cascade occurs decreases in the
size of the shock. However, for large shocks to the common asset of 20 percent, increasing
the parameter ` reduces the extent of cascades. Intuitively, a sufficiently large parameter
` means that some organizations have significant negative positions in the common asset
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(short positions—e.g., Goldman Sachs in the 2008 crisis), and their value initially increases
as a result of the shock. This can be sufficient for them, and those who have holdings in
them, to survive the failure of many other organizations.
5 Using the Dependency Matrix
This section validates direct manipulation of the dependency matrix A. First, Proposition
OA1 below shows that absent any discontinuities (i.e., with failure costs of zero for all
organizations), any change in C or A can be represented as changes in D alone. However,
we may want to hold D fixed and ask when there is a C giving rise to a given A. In other
words, we want to have an explicit description of the image of the function C 7→ Ĉ(I−C)−1
(i.e., the image under this map of all C satisfying our maintained assumptions). Proposition
OA2 below identifies a simple necessary and sufficient condition for any given A to be in
this image.
Proposition OA1. Assuming there are no failures, for any pair D,C, there is a pair
D′,C′, with C′ being the matrix of 0’s (and Ĉ′ being the identity), that results in the same
organization values for any underlying asset prices p. Similarly, for any A,D there is a D′
that results in the same organization values for any underlying asset prices p, with C = 0.
Proposition OA1 follows directly from letting
D′ = (Ĉ(I−C)−1)D = AD.
Thus, in the absence of failure, it is simply the indirect holdings of underlying assets that
matter, and so one can work with equivalent direct holdings in studying organizations’ values.
The proposition implies that instead of considering trades in cross-holdings, when we
are working to understand what might trigger a first failure (so that no failure has yet
occurred) there is always some trade in underlying assets that replicates any given trade in
cross-holdings.
However, in practice, at least some of the underlying assets are not directly tradeable and
so can be exchanged only through cross-holdings.10 To work in the underlying asset space,
we therefore want to know when trades of underlying assets can be replicated through an
exchange of cross-holdings, keeping the organizations’ asset holdings (D) constant. Propo-
sition OA2 answers this question. We say a square matrix C is permissible if the diagonal is
zero, there are no negative entries, and each column sums to strictly less than 1; the diagonal
matrix Ĉ is obtained from any permissible C by letting Ĉjj = 1−
∑
i 6=j Cij .
10If all underlying assets were freely tradeable, then there would be no reason for any cross-holdings. Any
portfolio of claims to underlying assets held through cross-holdings could be replicated as direct holdings
and without any risk of devaluation through failure.
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Proposition OA2. There is a permissible C such that A = Ĉ(I −C)−1 if and only if A
is invertible and column-stochastic, and the following conditions hold: (A−1)ii > 0 for all i
and (A−1)ij ≤ 0 whenever j 6= i.
Proof of Proposition OA2: First, some preliminaries. Recall from (5) in the main text
that
A = Ĉ(I−C)−1.
If A is invertible, manipulating this equation yields the following string of equivalences:
A−1 = (Ĉ(I−C)−1)−1
A−1 = (I−C)Ĉ−1
A−1Ĉ = I−C
C = I−A−1Ĉ. (OA-1)
Considering entry (i, i) of this matrix equation, and recalling that Ĉ is a diagonal matrix:
Cii = 1− (A−1)iiĈii.
If Cii = 0, the equations of (OA-1) that correspond to the diagonal entries are equivalent to
the following collection of equations (as i ranges across all values):
Ĉii = 1/(A
−1)ii. (OA-2)
This allows us to express the right-hand side of (OA-1) in terms of just A. To summarize,
we have shown:
Lemma OA1. Whenever A is invertible and C has a zero diagonal, the system consisting
of (OA-1) and (OA-2) is equivalent to the system
A = Ĉ(I−C)−1 and
Ĉjj = 1−
∑
i 6=j
Cij for all j.
Now we can prove the “only if” direction of the proposition. Take a permissible C. It
follows directly from the formula A = Ĉ(I − C)−1 and from the existence of the inverse
on the right-hand side (which we established in the main text) that A is invertible. And
since a permissible C has zero diagonal, we can apply the lemma. Using that Ĉ has strictly
positive diagonal entries, it follows from (OA-2) that (A−1)ii > 0 for every i. And since
any permissible C has nonnegative off-diagonal entries, and Ĉ has strictly positive diagonal
entries, we deduce from (OA-1) that (A−1)ij ≤ 0 whenever j 6= i. Footnote 18 in the main
text shows that A is column-stochastic.
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Next, we prove the “if” direction of the proposition. Given an invertible and column-
stochastic A, we will let C and Ĉ be the matrices defined by (OA-1) and (OA-2). It follows
immediately from these definitions that C has 0’s on its diagonal. Lemma OA1 then gives
that A = Ĉ(I − C)−1 and that Ĉ satisfies the equation Ĉjj = 1 −
∑
i 6=j Cij , for every j.
Thus, to finish the proof, it suffices to check that C is permissible.
First we prove that C + Ĉ has columns summing to 1. By hypothesis, A is column-
stochastic, so 1TA = 1T , where 1 is a column of 1’s. Now post-multiply by A−1. We then find
that 1T = 1TA−1 and so A−1 also has columns summing to 1. Therefore,
∑n
i=1(A
−1)ijĈjj =
Ĉjj
∑n
i=1(A
−1)ij = Ĉjj . Adding Ĉ to both sides of equation (OA-1), we then have, for any j
n∑
i=1
Cij + Ĉij =
n∑
i=1
[
Iij − (A−1)ijĈjj + Ĉij
]
= 1− Ĉjj + Ĉjj = 1
Assuming (A−1)ii > 0, we deduce Ĉii > 0 from (OA-2). Combining this with (OA-1) and
the assumption that (A−1)ij ≤ 0 whenever j 6= i guarantees that the off-diagonal entries of
C are nonnegative. These observations show that C has nonnegative entries and that its
columns sum to less than 1. And that concludes the demonstration that C is admissible.
6 Bounds on the Dependency Matrix
We provide some useful upper bounds on the possible values of the dependency matrix A.
Let c = maxk(1− Ĉkk); let
Aij = Ĉii
c
1− c maxk 6=i
Cik
1− Ĉkk
and let
Aii = Ĉii
(
1 +
c
1− c maxk 6=i
Cik
1− Ĉkk
)
.
Lemma OA2. Aij is an upper bound on Aij for all i and j. Therefore, if Ĉii = 1− c for all
i,11 then Aij ≤ maxk 6=i Cik for each i with j 6= i, and Aii ≤ (1− c) + maxk 6=i Cik.
Proof. Recall that
A = Ĉ(I−C)−1,
or, equivalently, that
A = Ĉ
∞∑
t=0
Ct.
11So that each organization has c of its proprietary holdings shared out to other organizations and retains
1− c.
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Let C be the matrix for which we set C ij =
Cij
1−Ĉjj . Then
A ≤ Ĉ
∞∑
t=0
ctC
t
.
Note that C is a column-stochastic matrix. It follows that C
t−1
is also column-stochastic
for any t ≥ 1 (because it is a column-stochastic matrix raised to a power). Write Ct =
CC
t−1
. From this, given the fact that C
t−1
is column-stochastic for each t, it follows that
the entry (i, j) of C
t
is no more than maxk 6=i Cik1−Ĉkk
. Also, note that for t = 0, entry (i, j) of
C
t
when j 6= i is 0. Thus, for i 6= j,
Aij ≤ Ĉii
∞∑
t=1
ct max
k 6=i
C ik.
Then since 1/
∑∞
t=1 c
t = c/(1− c) it follows that
Aij ≤ Ĉii c
1− c maxk 6=i C ik,
This is the claimed expression for j 6= i. For j = i we have entry (i, i) of C0 being 1, and
the rest of the reasoning is the same. The simplifications when Ĉii = 1 − c for all i follow
directly.
7 Multiple Equilibria and Discontinuities in Organiza-
tions’ Values
In the absence of any failure issues, equation (5) from the paper simplifies to v = A [Dp],
which is just a standard pricing equation describing how the values of organizations depend
on the primitive asset values. The novel and interesting part comes from the failure costs
b(v). These terms generate several complexities that equation (5) illuminates.
The presence of failure introduces several forms of discontinuity which result in multiple
equilibria. Discontinuities in the value of a given organization i can come from two sources.
The basic form is that the failure costs of organization i can be triggered when the values
of underlying assets fall, which can, through either direct holdings or cross-holdings, lead i
to hit its failure threshold. The other form is due to another organization, in which i has
cross-holdings, hitting its failure threshold, which then leads to a discontinuous drop in the
value of i’s holdings and consequently its value.
In terms of multiplicities of equilibria, there are also different ways in which these can
occur. The first is that taking other organizations’ values and the value of underlying assets
as fixed and given, there can be multiple possible consistent values of organization i that
14
solve equation (5). There may be a value of vi satisfying equation (5) such that 1vi<vi = 0
and another value of vi satisfying equation (5) such that 1vi<vi = 1; this can occur even when
all other prices and values are held fixed. This generates a first source of multiple equilibria;
this corresponds to the standard story of self-fulfilling bank runs (discussed in classic models
such as that of Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).
The second way for multiplicity of equilibria to arise is through the interdependence of the
values of the organizations: The value of organization i depends on the value of organization
j, while the value of organization j depends on the value of organization i. And given the
discontinuities possible in prices due to failure costs, there can be multiple solutions. There
might then be two consistent joint values of i and j: one consistent value in which both i and
j fail, and another consistent value in which both i and j remain solvent. This second source
of multiple equilibria is different from the individual bank-run concept, as here organizations
fail because people expect other organizations to fail, which then becomes self-fulfilling.
Although governments may be able to give assurances (e.g., by insuring deposits) that
manipulate expectations regarding the self-fulfilling value of a single organization, it seems
more difficult to control expectations when an organization’s value depends on the expected
values of many other organizations. For example, an organization’s value can depend on the
expected value of an organization that falls under the regulatory oversight of another gov-
ernment. Suppose organizations i and j have cross-holdings in each other and organization
j also has cross-holdings in organization k. Investors in organization i may then become less
confident that investors will keep their money in organization j, or less confident that the
investors in j will have confidence in them or in the investors in k, and so on.
8 Including Multiple Equilibria Due to Bank Runs
This section extends the example in Section IIB. The same parameter values are used in
Figure 6 as were used in Section IIB and Figure 1, although the scale of the axes has been
adjusted. As can be seen, the scope for multiple equilibria increases a great deal once bank
runs are permitted. Note that i’s failure threshold conditional on i failing is shifted out twice
as far as i’s failure threshold conditional on j failing because i effectively pays 2/3 of his
failure costs but only 1/3 of j’s. As shown in Figure 6(d), there is a large set of prices for
which it is consistent for both 1 and 2 to fail. In these outcomes, total failure costs of 100
are incurred and failure costs of 50 are paid by each organization.
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Figure 6: The set of multiple equilibria is much larger once bank runs are permitted. Nev-
ertheless, the interdependencies provide an additional source of multiplicity even when bank
runs are permitted. The notation FFi|j refers to the frontier (in the space of underlying
asset prices) separating i’s solvency from insolvency, conditional on j’s failure costs being
subtracted from j’s assets.
9 Best-Case and Worst-Case Tradeoffs
We now return to considering multiplicity of equilibria due to the interdependencies between
organizations. We identify a tension between limiting failures in the best-case equilibrium
and worst-case equilibrium. Trades that prevent any organizations failing in the best-case
outcome can also make more organizations fail in the worst-case outcome.
We say that cross-holdings are best-case safest when they maximize the percentage de-
crease in asset prices that would be necessary for a first organization to fail. More formally,
(C,D) are said to be best-case safest at prices p if, in the best-case equilibrium, all organi-
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zations survive and the holdings (C,D) solve the following maximization problem:
max
C,D
min
i
vi − vi
vi
,
where vi depends on C, D, and p.
It is possible for all organizations to fail only if the total value of primitive assets less
all failure costs can be allocated in a way that leaves all organizations below their failure
thresholds. Such an allocation exists if and only if∑
k
pk −
∑
i
βi <
∑
i
vi.
Proposition OA3. Assume p has only positive entries; organizations’ failure costs are
a constant proportion γ of the value of their direct asset holdings (i.e. βi = γ
∑
k Dikpk)
and it is possible for all organizations to fail in some equilibrium. Then any asset holdings
that are best-case safest at prices p also result in all organizations failing in the worst-case
equilibrium at prices p.
Proof: If no organization fails, then their market values are
v = ADp.
The best-case safest holdings maximize the percentage loss that any organization can suffer
without failing. As all assets have positive value, this requires equalizing the proportional
loss in value each organization must suffer to fail. If this were not equalized, reallocating
assets at the margin from the set of organizations furthest from their failure constraints to
those organizations closest to them would increase the percentage loss in value that any
organization could sustain without failing. Thus, in a best-case safest asset allocation,
v = ADp = θv (OA-3)
for some scalar θ.
As, by assumption, it is possible to allocate the combined bankruptcy cost of all organi-
zations in a way that would cause them all to fail, we have∑
k
pk −
∑
i
βi <
∑
i
vi.
Using the fact that A and D are column-stochastic, and that failure costs are a constant
proportion γ of the value of organizations’ direct asset holdings, we can rewrite the above
equation as: ∑
j
∑
i
∑
k
(1− γ)AijDikpk <
∑
i
vi.
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Now, using (OA-3) we rewrite the left hand side as (1 − γ)θ
∑
i
vi and conclude that
(1− γ)θ < 1.
Now we will use this to show that it is an equilibrium for all organizations to fail. Note
that, if we take all organizations’ bankruptcy costs out of their values, we have:
A(Dp− β) = ADp(1− γ) = (1− γ)θv < v
Thus, all organizations are below their failure thresholds, and therefore it is an equilibrium
for all organizations to fail.
Proposition OA3 illustrates that if trades are undertaken with the sole purpose of achiev-
ing the best-case safest outcome, these same trades can also result in the worst possible
outcome occurring in the worst-case equilibrium—all organizations failing.
10 Details on Cascades of Default in Europe
We first discuss the data used and then provide the calculations for vi, the failure thresh-
olds. There are data available from the Bank of International Settlements on aggregated
cross-liabilities between countries on both an immediate-borrower basis (which reports all
contracts) and a final-borrower basis (which nets out contracts with intermediaries, replacing
them with contracts between the final parties). If two parties trade through an intermediary,
we assume that the intermediary writes separate contracts with the two parties (or acts as
some kind of guarantor). In this case, default by the intermediary would affect both parties,
and it is appropriate to use the intermediate-borrower basis data.12
The calculations of vi are based on the peak GDPs from 2008. The normalized 2008
GDPs (relative to Portugal’s GDP in 2011) are
12.0
15.3
1.5
9.7
1.1
6.7

.
This leads to 2008 values, based on the A matrix, of
12Note that calculating the A matrix is far more involved than just looking at the final borrower basis
data.
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v0 = Ap =

0.71 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.11
0.18 0.72 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.14
0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.12 0.03 0.70 0.03 0.05
0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.67 0.02
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.68

∙

12.0
15.3
1.5
9.7
1.1
6.7

=

13.1 (France)
15.4 (Germany)
1.0 (Greece)
9.8 (Italy)
1.0 (Portugal)
5.4 (Spain)

.
Thus
v = θ

13.1 (France)
15.4 (Germany)
1.0 (Greece)
9.8 (Italy)
1.0 (Portugal)
5.4 (Spain)

, and β =
θ
2

13.1 (France)
15.4 (Germany)
1.0 (Greece)
9.8 (Italy)
1.0 (Portugal)
5.4 (Spain)

.
11 Lemmas in the Proof of Proposition 3
Here we prove Lemmas 3 and 4, which are used in the proof of Proposition 3. We maintain
the notation of that proof.
Proof of Lemma 3: Let d∗ = max{d, 1}. By the Neumann series (equation (A1)) applied
to the structure of the present random graph, we have (absent any failures)
v = (1− c)
∞∑
p=0
Cp1 ≤ (1− c)
∞∑
p=0
cp(d−1∗ G)
p1 ≤ (1− c)
∞∑
p=0
(
c
d
d∗
)p
1,
where in the first inequality we have used a bound Cij ≤ Gij/d∗ on the entries of C, and
in the second we have used the fact that Gp1 ≤ dp1, which is easy to verify by induction
and the fact that d is the maximum degree in the graph G. This establishes that vi ≤ v˜max
for each i; the rewriting of the summation the way we have done in the definition of v˜max is
valid as long as cd/d∗ < 1, which we assume in footnote 50 of the main text. The argument
for the inequality vi ≥ v˜min is analogous: We use that Cij ≥ Gij/d and then the fact that
Gp1 ≥ dp1.
Proof of Lemma 4: Fix a j as defined in the statement. We will prove the lemma by
translating it into a statement about the probability of a certain event in a suitably defined
Markov chain, which turns out to be more intuitive to establish. Let C be defined by
Cxy = Gxy/dy. Consider a Markov process (Xt) with state space {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} and initial
state i. The state 0 is an absorbing state. From state x ≥ 1, with probability 1 − c, a
transition occurs to state 0, and otherwise, the probability of moving to any state y ≥ 1 is
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given by Cyx. Observing that C = c ∙C, it is easy to verify that Qji =
(∑∞
p=2 C
p
)
ji
is the
probability of the following event Ej : There is some t ≥ 2 such that Xt = j.
We will show that, once k is large enough, the probability of Ej is at most ε/[d(1 − c)]
for each j such that Gji = 1; since there are at most d such j, we then conclude by the
union bound that the probability of
⋃
j:Aji=1
Ej is at most ε/(1− c). Let T be the (random)
set of nodes reached with positive probability from i in exactly two steps. For a fixed
constant a, let M be the (random) set of nodes with a directed path of length at most a
to j. Clearly, |M | ≤ ∑ak=0 da ≤ da+1 (recall that the maximum degree possessed by any
node in G is d). In other words, M constitutes a very small fraction of the nodes in the
graph as the graph becomes large. Applying the Bolloba´s configuration model as outlined
in Section 2.1 of Cooper and Frieze (2004) to make precise the fact that T and M are
essentially independent conditional on i, we deduce that we can find n large enough so that
the probability that T ∩M is nonempty is at most ε/[2d(1− c)]. From this we can conclude
that Qji ≤ ε/[2d(1 − c)] + (1 − c)a. The first term is an upper bound on the probability
that T ∩M is nonempty. On the complementary event where T ∩M is empty, the following
holds: To return to j via a path of length at least 2, the Markov process has to take more
than a steps (by definition of T and M). At each of these steps, conditional on the history,
the process has a probability 1 − c of being absorbed at 0. Taking a large shows that
Qji ≤ ε/[d(1− c)].
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